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Abstract 
 
It is clear that presidents, in their unique position as sole leaders of an entire branch of the federal 
government, have vast powers at their disposal to utilize during their time in office. It is also clear 
that the occupants of the White House have always kept one eye on the task at hand and another on 
how they were shaping their own legacy. As voters and scholars continue to find greater reason to 
recognize the lasting impact of these legacies on the public, a new standard must be developed to 
evaluate presidential performance in the long-term. This study provides a framework for such an 
evaluation. This tool, the Framework for Long-term Economic Examination (or FLEX), is used to 
determine that a president has the power to influence the long-term national economy through the 
office’s policymaking powers. It also goes further and ranks modern presidents on their success in 
utilizing these powers to create positive economic change in the long-term. The findings from using 
FLEX provide a discernable path to move presidential studies forward. It also provides predictions 
around, and guidance for, the actions future presidents may take in order to have a long-lasting 
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“Ninety-nine percent of failures come from people who make excuses.” 
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Shifting Standards 
 
In politics, the question “What have you done for me lately?” sits on many voters’ 
minds during an election cycle. It is the standard that countless Americans have traditionally 
used to judge and evaluate a presidential candidate’s viability for office, critiquing them on 
their actions and the conditions of the most recent term in office. Yet modern presidential 
campaign tactics seems to indicate that American voters and politicians have begun to use a 
different standard of performance evaluation. 
For example, following the 2007-2008 housing and financial crisis, a major political 
topic during the 2012 presidential election centered on which candidate was better able to 
lead the country out of the continuing recession and back to economic prosperity. 
Interestingly, while Governor Romney took the traditionalist approach and attempted to 
attribute the slow economic turnaround to the actions of his incumbent opponent, President 
Obama and his team decided not only to defend his policies from the previous term, but to 
also ask that voters look at the economy from a long-term standpoint. A memorable 
moment during the second debate helps to illustrate this unique strategy. Both candidates 
were asked to respond to the following question from an audience member: 
Governor Romney, I am an undecided voter, because I'm disappointed with 
the lack of progress I've seen in the last four years. However, I do attribute 
much of America's economic and international problems to the failings and 
missteps of the Bush administration. Since both you and President Bush are 
Republicans, I fear a return to the policies of those years should you win this 
election. What is the biggest difference between you and George W. Bush, 
and how do you differentiate yourself from George W. Bush?1 
 
 
1 Commission on Presidential Debates, “October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript.” October 16, 2012, Hofstra 
University, Hempstead, NY. http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-
romney-presidential-debate 
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The President answered by saying, “Well, first of all, I think it's important to tell you that we 
did come in during some tough times…we had been digging our way out of policies that 
were misplaced.”2 In other words, President Obama blamed the continued economic 
struggles of the nation not on his own policies, but on the lingering impact of his 
predecessor’s time in office. He goes even further, claiming that the policies he had put in 
place just needed more time to reverse these effects, saying “And the plans that I talked 
about will create even more [jobs].”3 President Obama’ argument is there is a unique 
standard that must be used to judge presidents’ economic performances: evaluating the long-
term consequences of their actions beyond their own time in office. 
  Unsurprisingly, this standard came as a result of beliefs already being formed by the 
voters themselves. Look at the question from the town hall debate again: the audience 
member states, before either of the candidates had spoken, that she believes “America’s 
economic and international problems” are the result of the “failings and missteps of the 
[previous] Bush Administration.”4 In similar manner, a November 2012 study by the Media 
Research Center’s Business and Media Institute compared news coverage by the major 
networks for the entire month of September in both 2004 and 2012. It found that President 
George W. Bush was “blamed more than twice as often as Obama for the economy,” with 
Bush getting blamed for his “record on jobs” and the deficit by 14% of the news stories 
 
2 Commission on Presidential Debates, “October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript.” October 16, 2012, Hofstra 
University, Hempstead, NY. http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-
romney-presidential-debate 
3 Commission on Presidential Debates, “October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript.” October 16, 2012, Hofstra 
University, Hempstead, NY. http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-
romney-presidential-debate 
4 Commission on Presidential Debates, “October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript.” October 16, 2012, Hofstra 
University, Hempstead, NY. http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-
romney-presidential-debate 
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analyzed, while Obama was only blamed 6% of the time.5 Both the question and study 
capture the shift of standards by the American media, politicians, and citizens in how to 
judge a president’s economic performance, from the short-term to the long-term. This is 
evidenced by the fact that President Obama, with his continuous rhetoric on needing more 
time to repair the economic damages done by the Bush Administration, handily won 
reelection in 2012. 
 The shift from evaluating short-term accomplishments to long-term legacies creates 
a need for a new standard of viewing presidential politics. With voters focused on the long-
term consequences of presidential actions, future presidential candidates are likely to 
continue President Obama’s example both during their campaign and their time in office. 
However, just because one campaign has been successful in using rhetoric about the long-
term to their advantage does not mean that such claims are accurate, or even true. This study 
provides a framework for evaluating and quantifying the long-term performance standard. 
This tool, the Framework for Long-term Economic Examination (or FLEX), is used to 
determine that a president has the power to influence the long-term national economy 
through the office’s policymaking powers. It also goes further and ranks modern presidents 
on their success in utilizing these powers to create positive economic change in the long-
term. The findings from using FLEX provide a discernable path to move presidential studies 
forward. It also provides predictions around, and guidance for, the actions future presidents 




5 Seymour, Julia A. 2012. “Upside Down Economics: A Tale of Two Economies.” Business and Media 
Institute. http://www.mrc.org/special-reports/upside-down-economics 
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New Needs 
 
Questions revolving around presidential power and impact are not new to scholarly 
work, as both have been studied and debated since even before the U.S. Constitution was 
ratified. Prevailing theories are often grouped into a few standard categories:  
 
1. The Imperial Presidency – the belief that the president, due to their unique 
position as a single person in charge of an entire branch of government, has the 
potential to unilaterally act, in some cases even beyond their constitutional limits, to 
enact policy, with a risk of this consolation of power growing overtime, as well as 
during times of military action or national emergency (an idea popularized in Arthur 
M. Schlesigner, Jr.’s work of the same name). 
2. The President in Political Time – the belief that the president serves as one 
member of a large and multifaceted federal government and bureaucracy, and 
therefore must build various coalitions with other political actors in order to push 
policy forward (as described by Stephen Skowronek). 
3. The Persuasive President – the belief that presidents can use their unique platform 
to advocate a specific agenda, especially in regards to appealing directly to the public 
(as pioneered by Richard Neustadt). 
 
While, there are several theories regarding the use of power by presidents, only a small 
subset look at how these powers are used to influence the national economy in the long-
term. To date, almost all of the political and economic studies focus on what is called the 
“political business cycle,” a term coined by William Norhaus to describe the evidence he 
   6 
found of presidents from each party manipulating monetary and fiscal policy to increase 
economic productivity in order to increase their likelihood of being reelected.6 Norhaus in 
particular led the charge of testing the economic impact of presidential policies, focusing his 
works on the indicators of unemployment and inflation. Overall, he found that political 
actors will choose to “make decisions biased against future generations,” and that presidents 
seek to manipulate fiscal and monetary policy and governmental institutions to create 
economic prosperity in periods directly before elections in order to boost popular support, 
while instilling policies that contract the economy directly after an election to allow for the 
smallest of political backlashes.7  
Several scholars, including Edward Tufte, Robert Erikson, Kim Ezra Shienbaum, and 
Ervin Shienbaum, have further analyzed the subject, looking into disposable income, per 
capita income, and public perception and approval ratings. All of them reached the same 
conclusion as Norhaus: that presidents, as the imperial president theory suggests, have the 
power to influence the economy and use that influence to their own political benefit. 
Scholars such as Douglas Hibbs go even further in their evaluation, and establish a partisan 
theory to the political business cycle, claiming that while Democrats keep economic 
standards at normal and consistent levels before heightening them before elections, while 
Republicans actively contract the economy so that the pre-election elevation seems more 
dramatic.8 The political economic cycle can even be used to determine whether or not a 
presidential candidate will be elected to office, providing “even a better predictor of 
 
6 Norhaus, William D. 2001. “The Political Business Cycle.” Review of Economic Studies, 169-90. 
7 Norhaus, William D. 2001. “The Political Business Cycle.” Review of Economic Studies, 187.  
8 Hibbs, Douglas A.. 1987. The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
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presidential election outcomes than the electorate’s relative attraction to the Democratic and 
Republican candidates.”9  
This analysis of presidential economic actions, however, only concerns the time 
before a president is running for reelection, ignoring his work during the full-length of his 
term, and the results of that entire body of work when he is no longer the candidate seeking 
office. Only recently have scholars begun applying traditional theories of presidential power 
to the long-term. In particular, Larry Bartels’ Unequal Democracy (2008), serves as a basis for 
several modern political economists to demonstrate that political time mattered more than 
the political business cycle in determining long-term economic outcomes. Originally, Bartels 
sought to extend the previous political business cycle and partisan theory of Hibbs from the 
short-term to the long-term. In his analysis, Bartels studied the impact of Democratic and 
Republican presidents on the growing level of income inequality during the past four 
decades. Bartels concluded that the political business cycle does exist, and that Republicans 
have contributed the greatest amount to income inequality.10  
However, Jacob Hacker, Paul Pierson, James Campbell, and Lane Kenworthy all 
contradict this theory, claiming that the long-term inequality is not a party standard, but 
rather consistently growing over presidents of both parties during the forty-year period. In 
an effort to better flesh out the president’s impact on the issue of income inequality in the 
long term, Paul Pierson and Jacob Hacker used Skowronek’s theory of political time to 
determine that political coalition building over the long-term is the greatest power the 
president can use to shape the long-term economy and create lasting pieces of policy and 
 
9 Erikson, Robert. 1989. “Economic Conditions and The Presidential Vote.” The American Political Science 
Review, 83, no. 2: 567. 
10 Bartels, Larry M.. 2016. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. Second edition. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
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legislation. 11 Using the George W. Bush tax cuts as an example, Pierson and Campbell show 
that such a law could not have been passed, let alone renewed over several following years, 
had it not been for the coalition of party leaders, interest groups, lobbyists, and citizen 
activists over the years preceding Bush’s presidency. These individuals and groups were 
necessary to provide the support to enact such a wide-sweeping economic policy, and to 
keep it in place through continued activism and institutional checks even after President 
Bush had left office. Thus, presidents who can build such strong coalitions, or utilize those 
that already exist, have a much greater pool of power to shape long-term economic 
conditions than any one party or individual president can do over a short amount of time. 
While these efforts provide the first substantial look at comparing presidents’ 
political and economic success over the long-term, there are many gaps and flaws to the still 
somewhat new research that has only taken place over the past decade. First, Pierson and 
Hacker dismiss all other forms of presidential power, including the veto and appointments 
powers, as insignificant in the analysis of policymaking. As earlier studies of presidential 
influence show, there are a wide variety of powers available to the president that need to be 
considered, and such powers as the president’s role as chief negotiator in foreign affairs can 
have significant impacts on policymaking, both domestically and abroad. Therefore, 
empirical testing must be done on the effectiveness of these powers before they are 
completely ruled out. Furthermore, modern political economists have focused a bulk of their 
studies on the question of what caused the rapid income inequality of the past forty years. 
While important, economic policies with long-reaching impacts, such as the Bush tax cuts, 
the Affordable Care Act, or the Great Society legislation, should also be analyzed. Finally, 
 
11 Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2012. “Presidents and the Political Economy: The Coalition Foundations 
of Presidential Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42, no.1: 101-131. 
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the relevant economic impact of these policies, such as if the Bush tax cuts have either 
increased consumption and saving by Americans, has not been considered, and must be 
before a long-term economic policy can be categorized as a failure or success. Unfortunately, 
the papers listed here, and the handful of other studies like them, have only focused their 
analysis on single policy issues, most often income inequality over time, so that no single or 
group of studies has yet to provide a complete picture of what is the full extent of a 





This study begins filling this gap of knowledge on and answer these important 
questions. The first chapter addresses whether or not there is evidence that presidents have 
intentionally sought to pass policies with long-term economic consequences, and, if so, why? 
In order to know if constituents can truly hold presidents accountable for the long-term 
impacts of the policies they pass, we must first determine if such results are the desire and 
intent of the presidents themselves, and what incentivizes them to pursue such actions. This 
historical evaluation will rely upon primary sources in the form of presidential speeches and 
archived documents, as well first-person interviews with various economic advisors to 
various recent presidential administrations. 
The second chapter builds off the results of the first, and seek to answer which 
presidents were successful in passing policies that had long-term economic impacts and why 
they were able to do so. To answer this question, the study seeks to identify which powers of 
the Office of the President are most well suited for deploying to create policy. Furthermore, 
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analysis is completed to determine which of these policies survived into future 
administrations, as those that are overturned, amended, or otherwise changed from the 
original intention do not provide the longevity necessary to have an impact on the long-term 
national economy. To do this, the chapter sets the parameters and foundation for what types 
of powers presidents have deployed to make these policies a reality for the people. 
The third and final chapter takes the evidence gathered previously, and focus on the 
set of presidential powers determined to be the most effective in creating these policies. This 
installment serves as a policy prescriptive section, taking the learnings from the previous 
chapters of this work, as well as bringing in outside research on economic growth and policy, 
and finally presenting a quantitative analysis of various economic and policy data points to 
provide evidence of the actual impact on the national economy from a president’s long-term 
policies. Additionally, this analysis provides a possible path forward for future presidents 
seeking to successfully establish their own long-term economic policies with positive 
outcomes for the nation. 
Each of these chapters will be constructed in similar fashion, with an introduction to 
the specific topic being analyzed, followed by details on the data and calculation methods 
used for each one specifically. The following sections will include tables and graphs to help 
visualize the results of the data gathering, and will conclude with any inferences that can be 
determined from the analysis that was performed. Such topics as those being discussed 
understandably draw from much of the research already performed, but in order to add to 
this literature, this study also pursues specific ideas not yet analyzed. That being the case, 
shortcomings in the data and analysis, as well as possible solutions for further and future 
studies will be addressed in the final chapter of this work, which will also discuss the 
comprehensive conclusions that can be drawn from all of the previous chapters. Ultimately, 
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the concluding chapter will also offer policy recommendations to not only improve 
America’s performance when dealing with these topics of both the political process and the 
national economy, but also that of the rest of the world’s, given the far-reaching impact of 
the U.S.’s policy choices in these areas. The last pages will contain a complete list of 
references utilized throughout this work, and a curriculum vitale of the author.  






Looking to the Horizon 
 
Analyzing Presidential Motivations and Incentives to Create 
Long-Term Economic Policies 
 
 
“We did not come to fear the future. We came here to shape it.” 
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Start with the Basics 
 
Before determining the effectiveness of a president’s long-term policies and their 
economic impact, the most basic of questions must first be asked: do presidents even have 
the hope and desire to create such lasting policies? Intuitively, it would make sense that they 
do: why spend all the time, energy, and money required to get elected to the highest office in 
the land only to enact polices that will be overruled or changed once you leave? Or to view it 
from a different angle: to understand how important a president’s legacy is to him, just look 
at the how often one of the first things a president does after leaving office is write a memoir 
and build a library. If a president’s goal was only to win re-election and influence the nation 
while in office, why keep talking about your administration’s triumphs and failures of the 
past, as well as try to influence later generations with your political ideals? 
But such assumptions cannot be made when tackling questions of policies and their 
impact on a national scale. If presidents are being held to the standard of what their long-
term impact is, as defined by the Framework for Long-term Economic Examination 
(FLEX), then this study must first identify whether or not presidents themselves see their 
actions as having such an impact beyond their own time in office. It is true that political 
pundits, journalists, and the general public at least are enamored by the idea of judging a past 
president’s performance, and evaluating their impact even decades after they have left office. 
As Costas Panagopoulos states in his empirical analysis of ex-presidential approval ratings, 
“Political observers and presidents alike are preoccupied with the notion of presidential 
legacy. Speculation about how presidential actions will be viewed by future generations 
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weighs heavily on the minds of chief executives.”12 How can Panagopoulos make such a 
bold claim as to know what past presidents are preoccupied with? According to fellow 
scholars Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Emily Charnok, and James A. McCann, one simply needs to 
pick up one of the many books written by former presidents: 
To be sure, presidential memoirs are replete with references to one’s place in 
history and long-term legacy – reflections that appear to loom more heavily 
the longer a chief executive occupies the White House.13 
 
Tenpas, Charnok, and McCann provide empirical evidence supporting these 
observations. By analyzing presidential flight and travel histories, the authors found that 
presidents focused their first-term visits on destinations key to winning reelection (for 
example, battleground states). However, in their second term, if they had one, travel logs 
provide “at least two broad lessons…one is that without the shackles of the permanent 
campaign, presidents are liberated to pursue their own goals (legacy building); and second, a 
liberated president tends to spend more time abroad.” These authors also bring up an 
intriguing point relevant to the question about presidential motivations when creating 
policies: do one-term presidents act differently than two-term presidents? Would presidents 
in their second term, with no chance of (or need to concern themselves over) running for 
office again, be more likely to enact economic policies with long-term implications than 
 
12  Panagopoulos, Costas. 2012. “Ex‐Presidential Approval: Retrospective Evaluations of Presidential 
Performance.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, no. 42: 719-729. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.04014.x 
 
13 Dunn Tenpas, Kathryn and Charnock, Emily and McCann, James A.. 2012. "Second-Term Presidential 
Travel: The Impermanent Campaign and the Rise of Legacy-Building, 1957-2009.” APSA 2012 Annual 
Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2107307 
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presidents acting in their first, and sometimes only, term? According to administration 
memos from President Reagan’s tenure: 
“It seems to me that the President needs to decide what his legacy is going 
to be,” [Tom] Korologos wrote on January 24, 1985, a few days after 
Reagan’s second inaugural. “What is he going to be the most proud of when 
he’s sitting at the ranch with Nancy four and five years after his Presidency? 
Is it going to be an arms control agreement? Is it going to be a balanced 
budget? Is it going to be worldwide economic recovery? Is it going to be a 
combination of all of this: peace and prosperity? . . . Every speech; every 
appearance; every foreign trip; every congressional phone call and every act 




This chapter provides further evidence to the theory that presidents do indeed act 
with a long-term impact in mind. To build this evidence, this chapter first outlines the 
specific criteria of evaluation and the definitions of terms necessary to limit the scope of the 
study to only those presidents and presidential actions that have a long-term economic 
impact, and do so in a non-partisan, non-biased manner. The next section then utilizes 
original source materials from presidents themselves and their advisors in order to determine 
whether or not each administration actually sought to establish any long-term economic 
policy during their time in office. By this chapter’s conclusion, it is clear that presidents do 
indeed have goals of establishing long-term economic policy, that they have attempted to do 
so throughout each administration, and that there are identifiable goals that can be tracked 
and tested for success or failure in further analyses utilizing the Framework for Long-term 
Economic Examination (FLEX) established throughout the rest of this thesis.  
 
14 Ryan Lizza, “The Second Term: What Would Obama do if Reelected?” 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/18/120618fa_fact_lizza#ixzz23NpvnSaR (accessed August 
12, 2012).  
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Terms 
 
As is the case when dealing with any political institution as long-established as the 
Presidency of the United States of America, specific criteria and definitions for key terms 
must be in place in order to ensure against bias and “cherry-picking” of data to serve either a 
specific political or theoretical agenda over another. Thus, this section briefly describes the 
methods used in acquiring the data for this analysis, detailing the standards for which data 
was relevant and not, and how it will be used to answer the critical questions that have thus 
far been raised. 
 
Presidents: In order to avoid bias based on political partisanship, six modern presidential 
administrations were chosen for analysis, three from each party, and each party serving the 
same amount of time and terms in office (three presidents, combining for five total terms). 
This subset of modern presidents was also chosen for analysis because they served in a time 
following the greatest economic policy expansion by any president under President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. Not including FDR allows the statistical problems associated with 
this outlier to be put aside, while also providing a set of controls on other factors not 
analyzed in this study, such as level of worldwide economic trade, technological capabilities, 
and overall political circumstances. Though there are marginal differences in these factors 
for each administration, they are relatively stable over the modern era, especially when 
considering the vast differences in these circumstances for administrations across different 
centuries. Additionally, the most recent presidential administrations, of Presidents Trump 
and Biden, have not been included as the long-term impacts of their policies have yet to be 
seen, let alone be measured and analyzed. Further studies should include earlier presidents in 
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order to see if there are any greater historical patterns of presidential actions in creating long-
term economic policies, though these studies will need to control for the outliers and outside 
factors previously mentioned. Thus, the presidents evaluated here include: 
 
• President Jimmy Carter (D) – 1 Term 
• President Ronald Reagan (R) – 2 Terms 
• President George H.W. Bush (R) – 1 Term 
• President Bill Clinton (D) – 2 Terms 
• President George W. Bush (R) – 2 Terms 
• President Barack Obama (D) – 2 Terms 
 
Long-term: This study distinguishes between long-term and short-term economic 
policies. To do so, it establishes that the long-term policies have an economical impact 
or consequence during a time after that president’s term in office is completed. Thus, 
policies enacted that change often, and are not consistent over a period of time, such as 
the Fed’s established inflation rate, are not considered long-term, though the 
appointment of Fed officials, with terms lasting fourteen years, will be considered long-
term. Nor will policies that have a specific “expiration date,” that ends their effectiveness 
after a certain amount of time without chance for reenactment, be considered. Long-
term policies are enduring, insofar as they have a relevant impact on the national 
economy beyond the time a president leaves office, as long as they do not get overturned 
or overruled by the courts, or be repealed by either their successor or Congress before 
they have a chance to do so. 
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National Economy: This study foucses on those long-term policies that impact only 
the national economy as a whole. Thus, policies enacted that have a limited scope or 
focus only on a specific locality or state are not to be considered. Policies must have a 
discernable impact on at least one of the following common measures of a country’s 
economic performance: GDP, Employment Levels, Overall Trade, Personal Income, 
Household Wealth, Inflation Rates, and Budget Deficits. 
 
Hopes & Dreams 
 To begin, the first step must be to see what the presidents themselves have said in 
regards to the policymaking plans they wished to accomplish while in office. Using the 
definitions of what constitutes a long-term, national economic policy issue, this chapter 
looks through each of the six presidents’ inauguration addresses, joint addresses to Congress, 
and State of the Union speeches. These often serve as the “laundry-list” of policy goals that 
the presidents have for their terms and the individual years ahead, and seek to identify any 
proposals that match the aforementioned criteria. Additionally, interviews were conducted 
with former Directors of the National Economic Council and Chairmen of the Council of 
Economic Advisors for each administration who were willing to answer this study’s 
questionnaire, which provide a more detailed look at each president’s economic goals from 
not only leading experts in the field, but also those with the greatest access to the presidents’ 
inner economic workings (See Appendix). These are paired with the annual Economic 
Report of the President, which is produced by the Council and sent by the President to 
Congress each year to provide both an update on the status of the nation’s economy, as well 
as a detailed list of actions the president intends to take in regards to economic policy. 
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A president’s inaugural address lacked detailed plans for creating economic policy 
during each of their terms, every president instead focusing on listing the problems of the 
national economy that they hoped to confront, without providing many specifics on how 
they would do so. Even President Reagan’s first inaugural, with the most references to 
economic policy issues of any president in this sample, failed to provide substantial policy 
goals, saying only “[t]his administration's objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing 
economy that provides equal opportunity for all Americans, with no barriers born of bigotry 
or discrimination.”15 The State of the Union (SOTU) addresses and the Economic Reports 
of the President, however, provide a much clearer picture of specific policy goals, legislation 
proposals, and unilateral action the presidents wished to take to combat the economic ills 
referenced in each of their inaugurals.  The interviews with the presidents’ economic 
advisors provided an even more candid insight into which policies were most important to 
each administration’s overall policy goals and received the most attention to the president 
and the staff. 
 What most inaugural addresses did showcase, however, was a glimpse into how 
presidents viewed the short-term versus the long-term implications of their being elected to 
the highest office in the land. In several speeches, the newly elected president spoke about 
how the actions they would take while in office would affect future generations, most 
notably in those of Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and Obama. Interestingly, these three also 
represent a majority of the two term presidents represented in this sample. Each of these 
president’s SOTUs and Economic Reports also show signs of specific policies focused on 
creating changes lasting beyond their own time in office, suggesting that there may be a 
 
15 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1981. “Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246336 
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correlation with passing long-term economic policies and a president serving a second term. 
Overall, it is also interesting to note that all of the presidents in this sample entered office at 
different points over a thirty-year period, they often sought to address the same issues, albeit 
through different methods of ideology and practice depending on the individual. This 
suggests that within this study’s sample, there is consistency with the problems each 
president was trying to solve, and thus allows us to better control for this aspect during the 
analysis across the various administrations.  
 
President Jimmy Carter 
As the first president in this analysis, chronologically, President Jimmy Carter set the 
standard in the inauguration addresses by only vaguely referring to the economic issues 
facing the nation. Instead, Carter’s speech emphasized morality and religion as key 
components of his incoming administration, saying of his plans that “[t]hese are not just my 
goals, and they will not be my accomplishments, but the affirmation of our Nation's 
continuing moral strength and our belief in an undiminished, ever-expanding American 
dream.”16 This is to be expected, as Carter’s road to the White House occurred in the wake 
of the Watergate Scandal, which had shaken the public’s trust in the president’s morality and 
actions. 
Like his successors, however, Carter was much more detailed in his Economic 
Reports of the President, specifically the first one he submitted to Congress in 1978. In it, 
the new president lists the following economic goals for his administration: 
 
 
16 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1977. “Jimmy Carter Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-0 
   21 
 Passage of his energy plan  
 Management of federal budget expenditures, reducing the federal deficit, and 
balancing the budget  
 Using tax reductions to promote steady economic expansion  
 Attacking structural unemployment  
 Promoting business capital formation  
 Reducing inflation  
 Policies that promote economic recovery throughout the world 
 
Furthermore, Carter spends the remaining sections of his Report expanding on each of these 
goals in detail, and it is clear that Carter saw these policies as having a long-term impact 
beyond his own term. For example, when describing his energy plan, the president states 
that “[w]ithout decisive action…these forces could severely limit the potential for continued 
economic progress over the coming decade. The United States has no choice but to adjust 
to the new era of expensive energy.”17  
 It is thus clear that President Carter had hoped to achieve a great deal while in office 
that would have a lasting impact on the national economy. Further insight into these 
intentions is evidenced in his final Economic Report. There, the president not only lists his 
administration’s accomplishments, but also includes a section entitled “Unresolved Issues.” 
There, he charts all of the areas in which he felt more work needed to be done and provided 
a pathway for his successors to take in order to accomplish these goals since he was not able 
 
17 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1978. “Jimmy Carter, Annual Message to the Congress: The 
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to do so. Even while leaving office, President Carter attempted to help steer the direction of 
the country, a tradition other presidents continued. 
 
President Ronald Reagan  
President Reagan’s first speech to a joint session of Congress was one of the most 
heavily focused on the economy of any president in this sample. Laying out his long-term 
policy goals, Reagan called for the following reforms: 
 
 Slow the growth of government spending  
 Reduce tax burdens  
 Regulatory reform  
 Controlling money growth  
 Expanding international trade18 
 
These goals embodied the long-term path Reagan had set out on during his first 
inaugural address, where he stated that “[w]e must act today in order to preserve 
tomorrow.” In fact, the policies listed above were simply expansions of the plan he had 
already outlined in his inaugural for the economy: 
 
In the days ahead, I will propose removing the roadblocks that have slowed 
our economy and reduced productivity. Steps will be taken aimed at restoring 
the balance between the various levels of government. Progress may be 
slow--measured in inches and feet, not miles--but we will progress. 
 
 
18 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1981. “Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery Online,” The American Presidency Project. 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-program-for-
economic-recovery 
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We must simplify our tax system, make it more fair, and bring the rates down 
for all who work and earn. 
 
I will shortly submit a budget to the Congress aimed at freezing government 
program spending for the next year. Beyond that, we must take further steps 
to permanently control Government's power to tax and spend.  
 
We must act now to protect future generations from Government's 
desire to spend its citizens' money and tax them into servitude when the bills 
come due. Let us make it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to 
spend more than the Federal Government takes in.19 
 
 
As can be seen, the president made sure to point out that these actions were not meant just 
to secure certain economic conditions for the present, but were necessary to “protect future 
generations.”20 Thus, from his first day on the job, Reagan was clear that his policies would, 
and should, have a long-lasting impact on the national economy. 
 
President George H.W. Bush 
  Reagan’s successor, President George H.W. Bush, is the first, and only, example of a 
president entering office following the tenure of a member of his own political party.  This 
dynamic is evidenced in the fact that H.W. Bush’s inaugural address sought to build off of 
his predecessor’s successes rather than chart a completely new course, saying: 
A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to 
push on…this is a time when the future seems a door you can walk right 
through into a room called tomorrow…We know what works…We know 
what's right…For the first time in this century, for the first time in perhaps 
all history, man does not have to invent a system by which to live.21 
 
 
19 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1981. “Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-11 
20 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1981. “Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-11 
21 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1989. “George Bush, Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address 
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Yet, the new president did not completely mirror his friend and mentor. Though a pattern is 
beginning to emerge on the types of issues the presidents seem to be most focused on 
(inflation, government budgets, international trade), a look at H.W. Bush’s first Economic 
Report showcases his own unique priorities for long-term economic policy: 
 
 Reduce government borrowing  
 Monetary policy focused on growth as well as reducing inflation  
 Removing barriers to innovation, investment, work and saving in the tax, legal, and 
regulatory systems  
 Avoiding unnecessary regulation and redesigning regulatory programs  
 Increasing free trade and open markets22 
 
Like Carter before him, however, H.W. Bush was unable to win reelection and thus did 
not have as long as others to put these policies in place. Of note, however, while Carter’s 
final Economic Report presented specific economic policy prescriptions for future 
administrations, H. W. Bush focuses more on what his own policy attempts tried to achieve, 
and why he thought they were important to undertake. However, this difference in 
presentation does not diminish H.W. Bush’s hope that his policies will last into the future. In 
the same Report, he says “America's future can and should be bright…The reform 
proposals I have put forward during my Administration, if enacted, would greatly enhance 
long-term economic growth, providing the foundation for higher living standards, a 
better legacy of prosperity for our children, improved social and economic mobility for 
 
22 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1990. “George Bush, Message to Congress Transmitting the 
Economic Report of the President Online,” The American Presidency Project. 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/300352 
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the disadvantaged, more resources to pay for nontraditional goods and services such as a 
healthier environment, and for maintaining America's economic and geopolitical 
leadership into the twenty-first century.”23 
 
President Bill Clinton 
As the president during the turn of the century, President Clinton’s speeches, addresses, 
and reports are filled with a great deal of rhetoric on the long-term impact of his policies, as 
he and the country looked to a new era of American prosperity. President Clinton put his 
goals and expectations in the clearest of terms, saying “our plan looks beyond today's 
business cycle because our aspirations extend into the next century. The heart of this plan 
deals with the long term.”24 This plan included: 
 Deficit reduction  
 Increasing public investment in technology, infrastructure, the environment, and 
education  
 Reforming the healthcare system  
 Opening foreign markets  
 Improving the efficiency of government 
 
Clinton’s final Economic Report, as was the case with all of the others, highlighted the 
economic successes during his time in office. However, a great deal of the Report also 
 
23 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1990. “George Bush, Message to Congress Transmitting the 
Economic Report of the President Online,” The American Presidency Project. 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/300352 
24 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley, 1993. “William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress 
on Administration Goals Online.” The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php 
   26 
focused on one final policy: the 2001 proposed budget. While not a laundry list of proposals 
for his successors to follow, nor a principle-based guide for a president of the opposing 
party to draw upon when creating future economic policy, Clinton’s 2001 Economic Report 
is clear in that the 2001 proposed budget should be adopted and would have long-lasting 
benefits for the national economy, stating: 
If we stay on this path, we can make America debt-free by 2012…The 2001 
budget also continues our strategy of investing in our people…A new, $1.2 
billion investment will help thousands of school districts make emergency repairs 
and renovations to our children's classrooms…The new budget also includes our 
historic New Markets and Renewal Communities Initiative, the most significant 
effort ever to help hard-pressed communities lift themselves up through 
entrepreneurship and access to new capital…this initiative will spur billions in 
private investment in communities that have not yet shared in our great 
economic revival.25 
 
President George W. Bush 
His successor, President George W. Bush, sought to continue and expand upon the 
groundwork from the previous Republican administrations of both President Reagan and H. 
W. Bush, his own father. As Bush’s Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Keith 
Hennessey says, “The income tax rate cuts, dividend tax rate cuts, Social Security reforms, 
and energy policies are all notable examples of a long-term policy focus” that the 
administration had during their time in office.26 These, and other policies W. Bush sought to 
enact can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Restraining spending by eliminating government programs  
 Reforming Social Security  
 
25 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 1993. “William J. Clinton, Message to Congress Transmitting the 
Economic Report of the President Online,” The American Presidency Project. 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/300364 
26 Hennessey, Keith. Interview #4, Appendix, 2013. 
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 Tax reform  
 Healthcare reform, specifically Medicare reform  
 Litigation reform  
 Securing the nation's energy supply  
 Reforming education and workforce training programs 
 
As is the case with the previous presidencies, W. Bush’s proposed policy goals would 
have wide ranging impacts on entire industries, communities, and individuals across the 
United States, and would have long-lasting effects if left in place. Hennessy provides further 
insight into how the administration viewed the longevity of the policies, saying “In 2002 and 
early 2003 we had a short-term focus, as well as in the second half of 2008. During the rest 
of the Bush Administration the principal economic focus was on policies to maximize long-
term economic growth.”27 These focuses are not surprising when the recessions following 
the September 11th attacks and the housing and financial crisis of 2008 are taken into 
account, which called for immediate action to stabilize the national economy. It is important 
to note, however, that according to his economic advisors, W. Bush’s economic policies 
were otherwise always focused on creating long-term impacts.   
 
President Barack Obama 
Finally, President Obama, entering office during the worst economic downturn since 
the Great Depression, did not limit his economic policy goals to only the immediate crisis. 
In his first inaugural address, Obama was already looking to the larger legacy he hoped his 
presidency would leave behind after he was no longer in the White House: 
 
27 Hennessey, Keith. Interview #4, Appendix, 2013. 
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The state of the economy calls for action, bold and swift, and we will act not only to 
create new jobs, but to lay a new foundation for growth. We will build the roads 
and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us 
together. We will restore science to its rightful place, and wield technology's wonders 
to raise healthcare's quality and lower its cost. We will harness the sun and the winds 
and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories. And we will transform our schools 
and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age. All this we can do. 
And all this we will do…Let it be said by our children's children that when we 
were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back, nor did we 
falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried 
forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.28 
 
 
Four years later, Obama continued to look to the future with his rhetoric and policy 
proposals, saying “We must act, knowing that today’s victories will be only partial and that it 
will be up to those who stand here in four years and 40 years and 400 years hence to 
advance the timeless spirit once conferred to us in a spare Philadelphia hall.”29 Thus, it is 
unsurprising that the history-making Obama would not be aware of the long-lasting impact 
his presidency would have on the nation, nor that such a responsibility would be embodied 
in each of his proposed policies.  
 Regarding the economy specifically, a summation of President Obama’s long-term 
economic policy goals include: 
 
 Healthcare reform (the Affordable Care Act, or ACA)  
 Passage of the proposed jobs bill  
 Improving the education system (American Graduation Initiative)  
 Clean energy initiatives 
 
28 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 2009. “Barack Obama, Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/217053 
29 Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley. 2013. “Barack Obama, Inaugural Address Online,” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/303425 
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 Increased research and development funding  
 Financial reform  
 Deficit reduction 
 
As was the case with George W. Bush (tax reform), some of President Obama’s policy 
goals mirror those of his Democratic predecessors (increased public investment), while other 
polices have been consistent throughout almost every administration (deficit reduction).  
Interestingly, there are also shared policies among different eras within this study’s sample of 
presidents: the first three all focusing on economic issues not listed among their successors 
(international trade, inflation), while consistent policies amongst the Clinton, W. Bush, and 
Obama presidencies (healthcare and education reform) do not show up on any of the earlier 
lists. These patterns could indicate a number of important insights: some economic policies 
consistent across most presidencies, regardless of time or party. Maybe presidents are 
beholden to the policies of their predecessors, or rather the focus of the nation at the time of 
their service, and therefore have little choice in what to prioritize attempting to pursue while 
in office. Could every president simply struggle to resolve the consistent issues facing anyone 
who occupies the Oval Office, and only those policies which are successfully dealt with are 
the ones that fall off the lists over time? If that is indeed the case, who should get the credit 
for solving these issues so future presidents could concentrate on new areas of long-term 
economic policy? And why should it matter? 
 
Incentives 
 From a cynical perspective, the issue of credit is at the heart of why these issues 
matter to every president, and why they are incentivized to pursue a wide variety of 
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economic policies, many of which have long-lasting impacts on the nation. As noted 
previously, researchers and experts have long argued that the condition of the economy 
often determines the outcome of a national election, the greatest motivator to any 
presidential candidate, or officeholder running for reelection. Gary Jacobson summarizes 
this wide-held belief, saying “Presidential candidates with economic conditions on their side 
(a good economy for the in‐party candidate, or a bad economy for the out‐party candidate) 
have a strong track record; according to Lynn Vavreck’s analysis, they won 11 of the 15 
elections held from 1952 through 2008.”30 Eric Guntermann, Gabriel S. Lenz, and Jeffrey R. 
Myers found that this phenomenon is not simply a modern condition, and in fact has been 
the case since the country was founded: 
 
Voters, we find, appear to judge incumbent presidents on the economy all 
the way back to George Washington. Consistent with this pattern, we also 
find that the economy appears to shape presidents' decisions to run again 
throughout US history. These findings support recent comparative evidence 
that economic voting is pervasive across a variety of contexts.31 
 
The infamous moto of President Clinton’s 1992 campaign team, “It’s the economy, 
stupid,”32 ensures that presidents, at least the modern ones in the sample, are well aware of 
the impact the economy has on presidential elections, and allows us to understand why they 
choose to tackle economic issues.  
 
30 Jacobson, Gary C. 2013. “How the Economy and Partisanship Shaped the 2012 [US] Presidential and 
Congressional Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 128 (1): 1-38. 
31 Guntermann, E., G.S. Lenz, and J.R. Myers. 2021. “The Impact of the Economy on Presidential Elections 
Throughout US History.” Political Behavior. 
32 The War Room, directed by Chris Hegedus and D.A. Pennebaker, (1993, October Films). 
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 For nonincumbent candidates, claiming to have the skills necessary to remedy the 
economic woes of the country left unresolved by the incumbent could likely explain why 
certain economic priorities carry over between different administrations, particularly those 
that are transitioning to new parties. For presidents of the same party, economic policies 
likely carry over due to the fact those are seen as the practices that worked and got them 
elected in the first place, or as some would put it, “If it isn’t broke, don’t fix it” (just build off 
of what has already been begun by your predecessor). The shift in economic philosophy by 
experts and the nation as a whole may also explain why some economic priorities appear or 
drop off each list throughout time. In this case, presidents are playing a role of follower 
more than leader on what to prioritize while in office, courting public opinion in order to 
gain their favor in the hopes of being reelected or having their party hold seats in 
government.  
 Whatever the reason may be, it is clear that presidents are incentivized to pursue 
economic policies as a means of winning elections, for either themselves or their allies. 
Additional evidence can be found for the pursuit of long-term economic policies by 
presidents, since they wish to remain favorably remembered by the public after they have left 
office. For example, why else would the first accomplishment listed on the official National 
Archives website for the Clinton White House list “Longest economic expansion in 
American history” at the very top of the Clinton-Gore Administration’s “Record of 
Progress?”33 Economic policies are obviously tied to voters’ evaluations of candidates, but 
are also important in determining the public’s view of which presidencies are seen as 
historically successful.  
 
33 “The Clinton-Gore Administration: A Record of Progress.” National Archives, accessed 2021. 
https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/Accomplishments/eightyears-01.html 
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As Clifford F. Thies notes, “Since Arthur Schlesinger’s 1948 survey, “Historians Rate 
U.S. Presidents,” published in Life, scholars—mostly historians have been rating the 
presidents.”34 Though Thies finds that “scholars are not impressed with presidents 
associated with a vibrant economy…[i]n contrast, GDP growth is positive and significant in 
both the popular and Electoral College vote regressions,” concluding that “the people care a 
lot about the economy” and are “impressed by a vibrant economy” when judging 
presidential greatness.35 As a personal example of this view, I clearly remember receiving an 
assignment for elementary school that required me to interview a grandparent and learn 
about how life was different during an earlier time period than my own. I decided to 
interview my grandmother, and, strangely enough, the only question I can now remember 
asking her was who her favorite U.S. president was during her entire lifetime. Upon a few 
short moments of thought, my grandmother, in her usual no-nonsense manner, informed 
me “Ike, because the economy was good under him.” Presidents are aware that their steering 
of the economy will not only be judged by current voters, but also future generations, and is 
therefore all the incentive they need to pursue long-term economic change, even if such 
policies have been attempted by previous administrations. 
 
Findings 
 This chapter sought to answer the question of whether or not presidents have the 
desire and incentive to influence the long-term national economy through the office’s 
policymaking powers, and determine what those goals were for each of the selected 
 
34 Thies, Clifford. 2014. “Ranking the Presidents: Scholars versus The People,” Academic Questions (Springer 
Nature) 27, no. 1: 79-93.  
35 Thies, Clifford. 2014. “Ranking the Presidents: Scholars versus The People,” Academic Questions (Springer 
Nature) 27, no. 1: 79-93. 
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presidents. The analysis was contained to a select group of modern presidential 
administrations in order to ensure political neutrality, to limit outliers and unique historical 
anomalies that may exist in pre-modern and even more recent administrations, and to ensure 
accurate data on the long-term impact of policies could be gathered and analyzed. It should 
be noted that while these limitations allow for a clearer focus on the questions this work 
seeks to answer, further research should be undertaken to go beyond these restrictions. 
Original source materials in the forms of presidential addresses and interviews with 
top-level economic advisors indicates that every modern president has indeed sought to 
influence the national economy beyond their own time in office by using their presidential 
powers to enact policies that would have major economic consequences for the entire 
country. Each speech, address, and report by the selected presidents contained language 
(highlighted in bold above) that indicated a long-term view of their individual actions. Other 
important trends that were evident were the consistencies While national addresses were 
often more high-level, big-picture focused, and meant to establish a comprehensive vision of 
the president’s entire agenda, the Economic Reports of the President and interviews with 
various economic advisors throughout the past decades helped to identify specific economic 
policy goals for each administration, as well as confirmed that these policies were proposed 
with a long-term existence in mind. These lists of long-term economic policy goals raise 
various new questions, however, regarding how some goals are consistent across all 
administrations, while others are seemingly determined by the president’s party or era. 
Answers to these questions come from understanding that presidents, both as candidates for 
the office as well as incumbents seeking to cement a positive legacy, are incentivized to 
create policies that the public views as having a positive economic impact on the nation. 
Therefore, presidents are oftentimes attempting to establish the long-term policies necessary 
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to address consistent economic concerns for the nation, whether or not past presidents have 
attempted to the do the same, and will also take on new issues that arise in the public’s 
concern. 
Thus, a comprehensive list of these goals and proposals, as summarized in Table 1 
(below), serves as the basis for continued analysis. In the following chapters, this thesis 
details how each president used the powers of their office to seek policy changes, whether 
each president achieved their goals, and what the eventual economic impact of their 
successes truly was beyond their own time in the Oval Office.  It is this structure that makes 
up the Framework for Long-term Economic Examination (FLEX), which can be used to 
broaden these inquiries even further. 
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President  Proposed Policies 
Jimmy Carter     
 Passage of his energy plan  
 Management of federal budget expenditures, reducing the federal deficit, and balancing the budget  
 Using tax reductions to promote steady economic expansion  
 Attacking structural unemployment  
 Promoting business capital formation  
 Reducing inflation  
 Policies that promote economic recovery throughout the world 
 
Ronald Reagan   
 Slow the growth of government spending  
 Reduce tax burdens  
 Regulatory reform  
 Controlling money growth  
 Expanding international trade 
 
George Bush  
 Reduce government borrowing  
 Monetary policy focused on growth as well as reducing inflation  
 Removing barriers to innovation, investment, work and saving in the tax, legal, and regulatory 
systems  
 Avoiding unnecessary regulation and redesigning regulatory programs  
 Increasing free trade and open markets 
 
William Clinton  
 Deficit reduction  
 Increasing public investment in technology, infrastructure, the environment, and education  
 Reforming the healthcare system  
 Opening foreign markets  
 Improving the efficiency of government 
 
George W. Bush  
 Restraining spending by eliminating government programs  
 Reforming Social Security  
 Tax reform  
 Healthcare reform, specifically Medicare reform  
 Litigation reform  
 Securing the nation's energy supply  
 Reforming education and workforce training programs 
 
Barack Obama  
 Healthcare reform (the ACA)  
 Jobs bill  
 Improving the education system (American Graduation Initiative)  
 Clean energy  
 Increased research and development funding  
 Financial reform  
 Deficit reduction 
 
Table 1: Proposed Policies by U.S. Presidents with Long-term 
Economic Implications 
 










Analyzing the Success Rate of Presidential Powers and Policies 





“Leave nothing for tomorrow which can be done today.” 
– Abraham Lincoln, Sixteenth President of the United States of America 
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By the Power Invested in Me 
Having shown in Chapter 1 that presidents do indeed seek to impact the long-term 
trajectory of the national economy, the next task is to examine the tools presidents have used 
to do so. As Mark Zachary Taylor states, “At first glance, it might seem that Presidents have 
only a minor role in determining the country’s economic prosperity.”36 Indeed, though 
presidents bear the responsibility of the state of the economy with the public during 
elections and when evaluating historical legacies, the president is only one actor in a large 
and multifaceted national government, one that itself is limited in how it can influence the 
free-market based economy of the United States. However, Taylor notes that: 
 
The Federal government as a whole has a variety of levers by which 
policymakers can affect the economy. Over time, these policy levers have 
included taxes, trade policy, land grants and sales, service contracts, 
procurement programs, regulations, loans, subsidies, anti-trust regimes, 
intellectual property, and even military action. The President has direct 
control over a subset of these policies.37  
 
In addition to formal levers of governmental control, the president’s position as the lone 
individual elected to national office allows the officeholder a great deal of indirect power to 
influence the economy. Dan B. Wood performed a “study [that] demonstrates 
that presidential rhetoric affects the risks that economic actors are willing to take,” finding 
evidence “that increased presidential saber-rattling produces increased perceptions of 
negative economic news, declining consumer confidence, lower personal consumption 
 
36 Taylor, Mark Zachary. 2012. “An Economic Ranking of the US Presidents, 1789-2009: A Data-Based 
Approach.” PS 45 (4) 596-604. 
37 Taylor, Mark Zachary. 2012. “An Economic Ranking of the US Presidents, 1789-2009: A Data-Based 
Approach.” PS 45 (4) 596-604. 
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expenditures, less demand for money, and slower economic growth.”38 Thus, it is important 
to remember that the Office of the President has a wide variety of powers at its disposal, 
unique to it alone, and neither the position itself, nor its many powers, should be ignored 
when considering whether or not they are useful in creating long-lasting economic change. 
The speeches and interviews examined in the first chapter not only provide a wide 
variety of evidence that presidents seek to enact long-lasting policies, but also indicate the 
types of long-term economic policies that the presidents wished to enact. In addition to the 
specific legislation the presidents proposed, the speeches illustrate the general ideologies 
each president possessed and the visions they wished to create through their powers to 
influence the national economy in the long run. This information allows us to measure their 
attempts to complete these goals, not only through the passage or failure of legislative 
proposals, but also on how their overall actions may have promoted these types of policies 
as well.  
This chapter analyzes the longevity of policies put in place by each modern 
president, isolating which powers are most effective in creating policies that are not easily 
overturned. The presidents are ranked by success rates in creating such policies, determining 
not only which powers are most effective in creating long-lasting change, but also which 
presidents were able to establish the most of such policies, collectively. This chapter 
concludes by using these insights to test if traditional theories of presidential power, 
including Arthur Schlesinger’s “imperial presidency,” Richard Neustadt’s “persuasive 
president,” and Stephen Skowronek’s “presidents in political time,” that have long been used 
 
38 Wood, B. Dan. 2012. Presidential Saber Rattling: Causes and Consequences. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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to develop the short-term models of presidential economic influence, can be used to develop 
a comprehensive analysis of presidential power to influence long-term economic policy. 
 
Policy Making Process 
In The President’s Agenda, Paul Light quotes a OMB assistant who said, “[e]very 
President has a certain amount of capital–you know, power, push, ‘juice.’”39 According to 
Light’s analysis, this power comes from both “internal” resources such as the President and 
his staff’s time information, expertise, and energy, and “external” resources, such as party 
support in Congress, public approval, electoral victory margin, and patronage. The paradox, 
is that while internal resources increase a president’s power and productivity over time, 
especially as he and his staff gain more experience and internal knowledge of governing, the 
external resources steadily decline over the same period of time, as political capital is used up 
and the public and political opponents begin scrutinize the president’s action or inaction. 





39 Light, Paul. The President’s Agenda. Johns Hopkins University Press (1999) 70. 
External
Internal
Figure 1: Light’s Paradox 
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Thus, while internal resources increase, external resources decrease; leaving only a 
small point of equilibrium that is the prime moment to enact presidential policies. Because 
this small window is hard to pinpoint, as well as fleeting, most presidential administrations 
resort to trying to enact as many policies as possible while they have the political capital to 
do, even if that means not having the internal resources necessary to do so most effectively. 
This will usually result in an expediting of the process of external decline because they are 
attempting to enact policies with little internal resources upon which to draw, thus requiring 
more political capital for each policy attempt that fails and must be tried again. More often 
than not, the belief that “the first 100 days” are the most productive of any presidential term 
encourages presidents to enact key policies as quickly as possible, whether they are actually 
most efficient in succeeding or not. 
 Scholar James Stimson adds to this political reality with his analysis of broader public 
support for the president. According to Stimson’s analysis, “[t]he approval accorded to 
Presidents by the American public is found to follow a cyclical pattern over time. All 
presidents begin their terms with great popularity, experience parabolic declines, steadily lose 
popular support for about three years, and then recover some at the end of their terms.”40 
Stimson’s cycle further supports the flurry of action in the first quarters of a president’s 
term, as administrations ignore their own abilities in favor of both political “juice” and high 
levels of public opinion that suggest they have a mandate, and sometimes an obligation, to 
pass certain policies as quickly as possible. Interestingly, Stimson’s cycle of approval ratings 
 
40 Stimson, James A. 1976. “Public Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 40 (1): 1-21. 
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did not differ for individual presidents, despite party and personal differences, suggesting the 
role of public support is constant for each administration.  
In his book, The Mild Voice of Reason, Joseph Bessette argues that the original intent 
of the framers was to create a Congress that would “blunt” politics and raise “deliberation” 
over issues instead.41 According to Bessette, this means that Congress is designed and most 
effective if it slows the policymaking process down and allows for thorough and open 
deliberation on the issues. Otherwise, politics will take over in the form of special interests, 
campaigning for re-election, and partisanship, which will dominate the debate while real, 
effective policies will fail to be deliberated, compromised over, and enacted by the 
legislature. 
Of course, the slowing down of politics by Congress is in direct conflict with the 
president’s urge and need to enact policies quickly, as described by Light’s Paradox. As Allan 
Hubbard, Director of the National Economic Council to George Bush, says, “[l]egislation is 
always a lot of back and forth.”42 In short, this contradiction is at the heart of whether a 
president is successful or not in achieving his policy goals, including those of long-term 
economic issues. How then can presidents successfully enact these policies if they have to 
work against the checks and balances of the other branches of government, as well as their 
own constantly-dwindling support from the public and other political actors? 
Light provides a glimpse into how a president’s goals are achieved despite these 
forces. In describing his theory of Legislative Expense, Light claims “In choosing among 
domestic alternatives, Presidents must evaluate potential costs – whether political, economic, 
or technical–against available political capital.”43 In other words, presidents decide to act or 
 
41 Bessette, Joseph. 1997. The Mild Voice of Reason. University of Chicago Press. 
42 Hubbard, Allan. Interview #3, Appendix, 2013. 
43 Light, Paul. 1999. The President’s Agenda. Johns Hopkins University Press, 110 
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not depending on each’s potential costs, or the amount of external resources one would lose 
in acting, a conscious cost-benefit analysis of opportunities. Thus, Light describes the use of 
different executive powers and actions as a product of these choices and the circumstances 
surrounding them: a weak president with seemingly little political capital with Congress or 
the public will be forced to either choose not to act, act only symbolically through verbal 
affirmations, or act negatively, such as using powers like the veto. Each use of power 
afterwards requires more and more political capital, and pushing legislation through 
Congress becomes less and less likely as time passes for a president in office.  
That does not mean the president cannot accomplish anything at all. Indeed, William 
G. Howell and Kenneth R. Mayer investigated how presidential actions changed from the 
beginning of a president’s term to the end, specifically the last one hundred days of a sitting 
duck president. The conventional wisdom had been that “an outgoing president has little 
ground upon which to advocate for their policy agenda. During his final months in office, 
his public prestige and professional reputation—the ingredients of persuasion, and the 
purported foundations of presidential power—run empty.”44  Howell and Mayer argue, 
though, that a president’s power is not so limited:  
By ignoring important policy options outside of the legislative process, 
scholars have exaggerated the frailty of outgoing presidents and 
underestimated the influence they continue to wield. Presidential power does 
not reduce to bargaining, negotiating, and convincing members of Congress 
to do things that the president cannot accomplish on his own. Presidents can 
(and regularly do) act alone, setting public policy without having to rally 
Congress’s attention, nor even its support (Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; 
Mayer 2001). With executive orders, proclamations, executive agreements, 
national security directives, and memoranda, presidents have ample resources 
to effectuate policy changes that stand little chance of overcoming the 
collective action problems and multiple veto points that plague the legislative 
process. And having “lost the attention of the permanent government,” 
 
44  Howell, William G., Kenneth R. Mayer. 2005. “The Last One Hundred Days.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 
Vol. 35 Issue 3, p533-553. 
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outgoing presidents have every reason to strike out on their own, set new 
policy, and leave it to the incoming administration to try and steer an 
alternative course.45  
 
Thus, as the research shows, this study cannot narrow the investigation into long-term 
presidential influence to one single set of powers, but must recognize that the timing and 
conditions under which presidents operate often influence how they will act and which 
powers they will leverage to achieve their ends. 
It is within this framework that this chapter distinguishes why each president acted in 
the manner they did regarding long-term economic policies, and why they were effective or 
not in enacting these goals. 
 
Presidential Powers 
In order to fully understand whether a president is capable or not of influencing the 
long-term economy, an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of every power available to 
the office must be conducted. This chapter does so by not only analyzing the hard 
powers (HP) given to the president through the U.S. Constitution and other legal 
statues, but also the soft powers (SP) associated with being the only nationally elected 
official in the country. When possible, this chapter seeks to categorize the president’s 
powers as hard or soft in nature, and in doing so will not only determine which specific 
powers are most effective in creating long-term economic policy, but which of these two 
types of powers are indeed most useful to a president seeking such policy goals. 
Additionally, this chapter distinguishes between positive powers (PP), or those that 
 
45 Howell, William G., Kenneth R. Mayer. 2005. “The Last One Hundred Days.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 
Vol. 35 Issue 3, p533-553. 
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promote a certain long-term economic policy, and negative powers (NP), or those that 
prevent long-term economic policies that are counter to a president’s economic agenda. 
Because this paper is determining which presidents have been most successful at 
achieving long-term economic legacies, it is important to consider how each 
administration used the wide variety of powers at their disposal to achieve these goals. 
Not all powers of the presidency can have a noticeable or substantial impact on national 
economic conditions (pardons and executive privilege), but those that are capable of 
being used to influence the national economy include: 
• Executive Orders (HP/PP) – The president’s ability to issue a wide variety of 
rules, regulations, and instructions with the binding force of law for federal 
agencies and the services they perform is a strong form of unilateral power 
exercised by the Office of the President, as these directives do not need formal 
legislation or Congressional approval to be administered, though legislation by 
Congress or rulings by the judiciary can make the EOs invalid or irrelevant. 
• Veto (HP/NP) – The president’s ability to not sign into law legislation passed 
by Congress, in the form of a formal or pocket veto, demonstrates a president’s 
power to influence legislation directly. However, the attempt to allow president’s 
the power of the line-item veto to only sign into law pieces of legislation that 
they approved failed in the early 1990’s, which would have greatly expanded this 
power of the office. Furthermore, vetoes can be overridden by a two-thirds 
majority vote of both chambers of Congress, thus providing an additional check 
on presidential power. Finally, the veto is a reactionary power, only able to 
negatively impact legislation by preventing it to become law, rather than 
positively enacting policies supported by the president. 
   45 
• Appointments (Hybrid/PP) – The president has the Constitutional authority 
to appoint both U.S. government officials and justices to the federal bench, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court. Because many of these appointments require 
Senate confirmation, this power is a hybrid between a president’s unilateral, 
nomination authority (hard power) and the necessity of partnering with the 
Senate for confirmation (soft power). The longevity of the terms of many of 
these positions, particularly those of the judicial branch, allow the president a 
broad range of power to establish ideologies impacting the long-term conditions 
of the nation. The focus on this power within this essay will primarily consider 
the ability of presidents to appoint members to key economic positions, 
particularly the Fed Chairmanship, as well as the performances of presidentially 
appointed justices have had regarding rulings on federal cases that had national 
economic consequences. 
• Negotiate Treaties (Hybrid/PP) – The Constitution establishes the president 
as the chief official in conducting foreign affairs, having the powers to appoint 
foreign diplomats, receive foreign leaders and ambassadors, and to negotiate 
treaties.46 Thus, because many of the most impactful treaties, particularly in the 
economic sphere, require Senate ratification to become law, this power, like 
appointments, could also be considered a hybrid, combining both the hard and 
soft powers at the president’s disposal. This study focuses on the president’s 
leadership in developing international trade agreements through bi-lateral, multi-
lateral, and international organization agreements or commitments, such as those 
 
46 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
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through NAFTA, the WTO, and the World Bank, which have a significant 
impact on the national economy through the import and export trade deficit 
levels. 
• Persuasion and Rhetoric (SP/PP) – A large source of presidential power 
comes from utilizing the “bully pulpit,” as President Theodore Roosevelt called 
the president’s unique platform to the nation’s news and interest. Especially in 
the modern era of social media, 24-hour news cycles, and the Internet, the 
president has a wide variety of channels in which to broadcast his policy 
message. Because of the Office’s central role in current governmental events and 
its single, unilateral actor, the president has a greater ability to get his message out 
to the American people than any other political official or group within the 
nation. The president’s ability to utilize this soft power to its greatest potential 
can provide him with the strong force of large public opinion unto the policy 
process, which could heavily influence lawmakers’ willingness to support the 
president’s proposals or not due to their dependence on the opinions of their 
voters. To analyze the success of president’s effectively using this power, this 
chapter will look at how often a president has attempted to persuade the general 
public through interviews, press briefings, and national tours, of a certain long-
term economic issue, and how popular each president is in public opinion polls 
during their attempts to enact such legislation. 
• Coalition Building & Party Leader (SP/PP) – As the only nationally elected 
political figure in the federal government, the President of the United States has 
the unique ability to serve as a focal point for a large portion of the American 
population’s policy goals. Utilizing the support for the ideas and policies 
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described during the successful campaign, presidents can organize a strong 
political following heading into office. This coalition can provide a large amount 
of outside resources, knowledge, and expertise to influence the policymaking 
process in order to reach a common end. With the added benefit of being the 
formal leader of his political party, the president has the ability to draw on these 
non-statutory powers to influence public opinion, pressure lawmakers, and pass 
legislation that benefits both his and his supporters’ long-term economic policy 
goals. This differs slightly from relying purely on rhetoric or direct appeals to the 
public, as the president’s ability to develop and hold together a coalition of 
political actors oftentimes involves many backdoor dealings and channels. This 
study will look at the ability of presidents to gain votes from different members 
of Congress for proposed policies to determine his level of support from both 
parties, as well as the number of outside groups that were either fighting for or 
against the presidents proposals, and determine if these coalitions were enduring 
enough to create long-term economic policies reaching beyond the president’s 
term in office. 
 
Use and Longevity of Presidential Powers 
The deployment of each of these powers depends on a wide variety of circumstances 
facing a sitting president. According to Arthur Schlesinger’s imperial presidency theory, 
presidents, over time, would act in more and more unilateral manners, deploying hard 
powers, such as executive actions, on a more consistent basis as they consolidate power in 
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the Executive Office of the President.47 Richard Neustadt’s persuasive president theory 
would have us believe that the president primarily relies on their soft skills of rhetoric and 
personality, directly appealing to the public and using their bully pulpit to drive public 
opinion towards the policy goals they wish to achieve.48 High approval ratings combined 
with numerous policy successes would signal that this theory was most prevalent in 
presidential action. Finally, Stephen Skowronek’s presidents in political time theory would 
lead us to expect that most presidential policies that are successfully passed come from the 
president’s ability to bring together the necessary coalitions and forces at the most 
opportune political moment to make policy changes.49 Legislative successes with Congress 
would serve as the greatest indicator of this theory being true. 
However, the point of this particular analysis is not simply to determine which policy 
proposals presidents were successfully able enact, but rather the long-term impact of these 
policies. Before examining the economic impact of each of these policies, this chapter 
identifies which actions by presidents lasted beyond their own terms, and thus how 
successful each president was at ensuring their hard work was not immediately overturned 
by the courts, Congress, or their successor. Therefore, in addition to seeing what types of 
powers were deployed and able to create a particular policy for the president, this chapter 





47 Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
48 Neustadt, Richard. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to 
Reagan, revised ed., New York, NY: Free Press 
49 Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, Revised Edition. 
New York: Belknap Press. 
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Executive Orders 
Interestingly, when one looks at the trends of issuing Executive Orders (EOs), the 
common belief, especially amongst imperial presidency theorists, is turned upon its head. 
Table 2 breaks down the number of EOs per president, the average per year, and the 
number and percentage that were remanded by future presidents (ranks amongst the sample 
for highest to lowest president for each of these categories are in parentheses). As shown in 
Table 2, the highest average of EOs occurred in the Carter Administration. President Carter 
averaged more than double the number of EOs compared to the President George W. Bush 
and President Obama. 
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 Table 2: Number of Executive Orders Per President50  
 
Why might this be the case? As will be seen later, President Carter had one of the 
lowest average approval rating among the public during his time in office. This small amount 
of public support was also combined with weak internal resources amongst the 
administration, as the President had famously filled the West Wing with an outsider staff he 
 
50 Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley, "Executive Orders." The American Presidency Project. Ed. John T. 
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. Santa Barbara, CA. 1999-2021. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/323876 
President  Term Total Orders Avg. Year 
 
Orders Revoked 









Total 320 (3) 80 (1) 179 (6) 56% (6) 
Ronald Reagan 
Total 381 (1) 48 (2) 110 (4) 29% (3) 
 










Total 166 (6) 42 (4) 58 (2) 35% (4) 
William Clinton 
Total 364 (2) 46 (3) 127 (5) 35% (4) 
 
I 200 50   
 
II 164 41   
George W. Bush 
Total 291 (4) 36 (5) 62 (3) 21% (2) 
 
I 173 43   
 
II 118 30   
Barack Obama 
Total 276 (5) 35 (6) 32 (1) 12% (1) 
 
I 147 37   
 
II 129 32   
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mostly brought with him from his days in Georgia. Though doing so helped insulate the new 
president from accusations of corruption and scandal that had plagued Washington since the 
Watergate scandal, it left Carter with one of the weakest starting points for pursuing his 
agenda, given the lack of experience he and his staff had in forging policy at the national 
level. Additionally, Congress, despite being mostly made up of Democrats, was looking to 
reinforce its place in the federal system of government that had seen a president abuse his 
executive powers, and thus the legislature provided additional roadblocks to  
Carter’s proposed policies they deemed too expansive. This led to much of Carter’s 
proposed legislation, such as his consumer protection, labor relations, and second energy 
plan, to not make it through either chamber and become law. These factors combined to 
reduce Carter’s effectiveness considerably in passing legislation to promote his long-term 
economic agenda. 
 Thus, it is not hard to see why a president in Carter’s position might rely more 
heavily on unilateral actions that did not require Congressional approval before being 
implemented. The fact that President Clinton also brought in a mostly young, outsider staff, 
might explain why he had the second highest overall number of Executive Orders, especially 
as tensions with Congress only grew over his two terms following the rise of Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich and the eventual impeachment of the president during his second 
term. Being a former governor with less ties to Washington may also explain why Reagan 
had the highest number of EOs overall. 
 More importantly, it is important to highlight the high levels at which EOs are 
overturned by future presidents. President Carter may have had the highest average of EOs 
established each year, but he unfortunately also had the highest rate and overall volume of 
them revoked, remanded, or amended by his successors, reducing their long-term 
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effectiveness. Indeed, presidential EOs have a relatively high rate of being overturned. 
Future presidents have just as much power as current officeholders when revoking prior 
EOs, allowing for changes to easily be made by new administrations, particularly ones of an 
opposing party. President Reagan revoked 385 prior EOs with a single EO of his own, some 
of them going all of the way back to the beginning of the 20th century.51 Therefore, EOs may 
be an effective tool for creating policy when no other options are available. However, relying 
on such a method, as Carter did, could result in a majority of them being remanded by your 
successors anyways, and the long-term effectiveness of your policies put into jeopardy, along 
with your overall legacy. 
 
Vetoes 
 The second hard power a president can use unilaterally without approval beforehand 
is the veto. While vetoes can still be overridden by Congress, the supermajority required to 
do so gives the president leverage when both considering and utilizing this unique tool.  
 
51 “Ronald Reagan Executive Orders – 1986.” 2021. National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/executive-orders/1986.html 
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Table 3: Number of Vetoes Per President52 
 
 
52 Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley. "Presidential Vetoes." The American Presidency Project. Ed. John T. 
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  President’s Party 
Seat Shares 
Vetoes  
President  Congress House Senate Total Regular Pocket Overrides Success Rate 
Jimmy Carter Totals   31 (4) 13 18 2 84.6% (4) 
 95th 67.1% 61% 19 6 13 0 100% 
 96th 63.7% 58% 12 7 5 2 71.4% 
Ronald Reagan Totals   78 (1) 39 39 9 76.9% (5) 
 97th 44.1% 53% 15 9 6 2 77.8% 
 98th 38.2% 54% 24 9 15 2 77.8% 
 99th 41.8% 53% 20 13 7 2 84.6% 
 100th 40.7% 45% 19 8 11 3 62.5% 
George Bush Totals   44 (2) 29 15 1 96.6% (1) 
 101st 40.2% 45% 20 15 4 0 100% 
 102nd 38.4% 44% 24 14 11 1 92.9% 
William Clinton Totals   37 (3) 36 1 2 94.4% (2) 
 103rd 59.3% 57% 0 0 0 0 n/a 
 104th 46.9% 48% 17 17 0 1 94.1% 
 105th 47.4% 45% 8 8 0 1 87.5% 
 106th 48.5% 45% 12 11 1 0 100% 
George W. Bush Totals   12 (5) 11 1 4 63.6% (6) 
 107th 50.8% 50% 0 0 0 0 n/a 
 108th 52.6% 51% 0 0 0 0 n/a 
 109th 53.3% 55% 1 1 0 0 100% 
 110th 46.4% 49% 11 10 1 4 60% 
Barack Obama Totals   12 (5) 12 0 1 91.7% (3) 
 111th 58.9% 60% 2 2 0 0 100% 
 112th  44.4% 53% 0 0 0 0 n/a 
 113th  46.2% 55% 0 0 0 0 n/a 
 114th  43.2% 46% 10 10 0 1 90% 
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However, as can be seen in Table 3, following a large spike during President 
Reagan’s term, the total number of vetoes per presidency has drastically decreased over time. 
However, their success rate in not being overturned is remarkably high, even when 
considering President George W. Bush’s lowest success rate, which is still at almost 64%.  
It may seem the veto is one of the most useful powers a president can deploy, 
considering it is almost an assured victory for the sitting president, both in the short- and 
long-term. However, some context must be provided when considering this presidential 
power. As noted above, the veto is a negative power; it does not create policy, but prevents 
policy from being created. Thus, a president cannot use it to establish new policy, but rather 
prevent policies that are counter to his end goals, maintaining the status quo. This was 
President George H.W. Bush’s intention when he used the veto to move forward his goal of 
saving in the tax, legal, and regulatory systems put in place by his and his predecessor’s 
administrations. Thus, H.W. Bush vetoed several bills related to governmental 
appropriations he disagreed with, thus creating desired change through a negative power.  
On the other hand, while overrides are rare, they can jeopardize not only a 
president’s particular policy, but also his entire agenda. The Washington Post described the 
override of President Carter’s veto of a bill repealing his crude oil fee as “his most 
humiliating defeat so far on Capitol Hill.”53 That override was all the more powerful because 
the president’s own party controlled both the House and Senate. Additionally, as noted 
previously, energy reform was a major policy focus of the president. Carter’s lack of good 
relations with Congress again dealt a blow to his presidential goals, even when he attempted 
to act unilaterally. As this example shows, while the risk of being overridden is numerically 
 
53 Dewar, Helen. “Senate Joins House in Overriding Veto, Kills Oil Import Fee.” The Washington Post, June 
7, 1980. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/07/senate-joins-house-in-overriding-
veto-kills-oil-import-fee/7f6d9ca5-bf93-43f6-a27a-8bd8dbe97f51/ 
   55 
small, the political risk can be much greater to a president if they cannot ensure that an 
override will be reached.  
 Similar to the EOs, vetoes appear limited in their ability to enact lasting policy. While 
EOs can be revoked by a future president, altered by legislation, or declared unconstitutional 
by the courts, vetoes are more susceptible to limitations on what they can be used to achieve; 
they are reactionary, not proactive. They are useful in curbing unwanted policies, but future 
presidents and Congresses would have no limitations in passing and signing similar laws 
during future sessions. Additionally, a veto override, while rare, has demonstrated that it can 
undermine a president’s broader long-term policy goals, as it wastes further political capital 
and results in a failure to achieve one’s goals despite the effort. Thus, the unilateral actions 
that have been identified, while easy for a president to implement, are seemingly just as easy 
to undo or backfire, and thus not as effective as those who believe a president wields large 
amounts of unchecked power might think. 
 
Appointments 
 Presidential appointments are best understood as a hybrid-type of power shared with 
Congress. The nomination of candidates for thousands of posts within the federal 
government lies solely with the Chief Executive. However, the power is not completely 
unilateral, as roughly 4,000 of the appointments require Senate confirmation.54 Therefore, 
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presidents must combine both hard and soft powers when attempting to place certain 
individuals into key roles. 
 Table 4: Judicial Appointments Per President55 
 
 
The analysis of the long-lasting impact of presidential appointments will focus on 
those posts that have tenures longer than the president’s own time in office, allowing these 
individuals to continue creating economic policy long after the president has left the White 
House. No better example of these type of long-serving, as well as heavily influential, 
appointments can be found than within the federal judiciary, where appointees serve life 
sentences in roles that allow them to be a check and balance on both of the other branches 
of government. 
As Table 4 illustrates, each president has had an opportunity, save for the two one-
term presidents, to appoint a large number of justices to the federal bench. Interestingly, the 
numbers for both the Supreme Court nominees and the overall total are somewhat 
consistent across all presidents, regardless of political party or time. This suggests that even 
 
















0 56 - - 203 3 0 262 (5) 
Ronald Reagan 
3 78 5 18 290 2 6 402 (1) 
George Bush 
2 37 5 2 148 2 1 197 (6) 
William Clinton 
2 62 4 7 305 2 5 387 (2) 
George W. Bush 
2 61 2 9 261 3 2 340 (3) 
Barack Obama 
2 49 6 3 268 2 4 334 (4) 
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if the power is useful in creating long-lasting policy, it is also one that can possibly be 
counterbalanced by those who follow.  
Table 5: Supreme Court Nominees and Impact56 
 
 
A closer look at the impact these nominees have on the longevity of presidential 
policies can be gained by looking at Table 5. Just as the number of Supreme Court nominees 
appears to be consistent across presidential administrations, the average number of laws 
overturned by the Highest Court in the Land remains steady across the decades, with the 
only outliers being the number of laws overturned under the Clinton and Obama 
administrations. However, even the high number of appeals under these two administrations 
are statistically small compared to the total number of laws enacted under each president. 
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Thus, the appointment of justices may seem less consequential to implementing long-term 
economic policy, as there is little variance between presidents succeeding in both appointing 
the justices and having their laws upheld by the courts. 
However, the impact of these overturned cases, like the veto overrides before them, 
can far outweigh their relatively low frequency. Take, for example, President Obama’s 
signature legislative achievement, the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA has been 
challenged in court almost 2,000 times, with a collective total of seven U.S. Supreme Court 
cases in the past decade alone.57 Key components of the law have both been upheld (the 
law’s individual mandate), as well as struck down (the federal government’s ability to 
penalize states for not expanding Medicaid eligibility). Thus, the appointment of justices to 
the Supreme Court and federal bench may not seem to have a statistical impact on which 
presidents are more successful or not in creating long-lasting policies, but the impact of even  
one case can have an outsized effect on the president’s long-term policy goals.  
 A similar pattern emerges when looking at the other long-term positions a president 
is able to appoint. A look at Table 6 shows that, like the judicial system, presidents have had 
a consistent number of opportunities to appoint chairpersons to several positions that serve 
longer than the four-year term of the president himself. Save for President Obama, the two-
term presidents have held a pretty steady rate of appointments, and the one-term presidents 
have comparable figures to one another as well. However, the appointments listed here are 
also an example of quality over quantity. The appointment of Paul Volcker as the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) Chairman by President Carter serves as a good example of this important 
facet. The Fed’s large impact on both the short-term and long-term economic conditions of 
 
57 Gluck, Abbe R., Mark Regan, and Erica Turret. 2020. “The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation Decade.” 
Georgetown Law Journal 108 (6): 1471-1534. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/wp-
content/uploads/sites/26/2020/06/Gluck-Reagan-Turret_The-Affordable-Care-Act’s-Litigation-Decade.pdf 
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the nation is well-documented, with various researchers finding evidence that its monetary 
and fiscal policy “powerfully influences real growth in the short run and inflation in the long 
run.”58 Bob Dombrowski even argues that Chairman Alan Greenspan’s actions, including his 
“pressure on banks to bailout the Long-Term Hedge Fund and its effect on the stock 
market,” helped President Clinton win 
reelection in 1996. 59 




 Thus, it is well accepted that nominating the Federal Reserve is a significant way that 
presidents can have an outsized impact on the long-term economic trajectory of the nation, 
 
58 “The Impact of the Federal Reserve System’s Monetary Policies on the Nation’s Economy.” 1976. 
FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/impact/HR_94_2_121976.pd
f 
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particularly because the Fed operates as an independent agency and cannot be directly 
influenced by future presidential administrations. Volcker’s appointment in particular is 
credited as to leading to the stabilization of the inflation crisis present in the 1970s. 
Ironically, his efforts did not bear fruit, will be seen, until the 1980’s, occurring after Carter 
left office. President Reagan reappointed Volker as Fed Chairman, thus keeping inflation in 
check throughout his presidency, and nominated Greenspan as his successor, who would go 
on to serve in the role for almost 20 years, influencing the economy for decades after Reagan 
had left office.  
 Therefore, it is clear that appointments are unique in their blending of both unilateral 
and cooperative power. Similarly, though they appear to be consistent in their quantitative 
opportunities across presidential administrations, the qualitative impact of these appointees 
can have long-lasting impacts on both the longevity of policies passed by presidents, as well 
as the trajectory of the national economy as a whole. Appointments are therefore a crucial 
part of how presidents can wield their power to impact the long-term economy, even if 
some of the results of these appointments are out of their control. 
 
Treaty Negotiations 
 Similar to presidential appointments, the president’s power to negotiate international 
treaties is unique in its combination of both unilateral powers (as the sole representative of 
negotiations with foreign entities), as well as collaborative soft powers (treaty ratification 
must come from the Senate). Some international agreements are formed through direct 
executive action, and can therefore be removed by future executives (similar to EOs), as was 
the case when President Trump exited the Paris Climate Accords that President Obama had 
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entered into during his term.60 Senate ratified treaties, however, are much harder to reverse 
by future administrations, and therefore provide a chance for presidents to enact long-lasting 
economic policy that will not only have an impact on the national economy, but also the 
international community, for years to come. Yet, by not requiring a vote by the entire House 
of Representatives, treaties, like appointments, are further removed from the political back-
and-forth that can often stall normal legislation. In other words, attempting to get a treaty 
agreed upon by one hundred individuals, only a third of whom are up for reelection every 
cycle is much easier than getting an additional 435 elected officials, running for office every 
two years, to fall in line with a president’s policy. 
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 Table 7 shows the number of international trade and investment ratified treaties 
within this study’s sample. As noted previously, the first four administrations listed here had 
prioritized international trade and investment within their long-term economic goals, and the 
number of treaties signed by these administrations, save for President Carter, demonstrate a 
commitment to this policy goal. Interestingly, however, it is President George W. Bush who 
has the largest number of treaties passed into law, despite not listing it as a high priority for 
his administration. Also notable, President Obama not only has the least number of treaties 
signed into law by any two-term president, but also has the highest number of treaties of any 
president that were never passed by the Senate during his term, notably among them the 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement Obama’s team had long pursued in achieving 
during his time in office.  
The explanations for these outliers likely vary. As noted before, President Carter 
suffered from weak Congressional support throughout his entire tenure, a barrier to any 
treaty proposals that required Senate ratification. Additionally, Carter’s term coincided with 
height of the Cold War, and therefore did not benefit from its ending, which opened up 
much of the previously Soviet-controlled world to opportunities for both diplomatic and 
economic relationships to be forged by later administrations. Finally, though Carter has the 
least number of treaties, two of the ones he did pass, the Panama Canal treaties, had both a 
large economic impact for the long-run, as well as jeopardizing any further treaties Carter 
could hope to pass during his term in office. The Panama Canal agreements under Carter 
allowed for Panama to regain control of the important waterway in 1999, almost twenty 
years after Carter left office. However, the resistance to the treaties, particularly amongst 
   63 
Republicans, was so strong that amendments were added to the treaty by the Senate before 
ratification and Carter’s already shaky support in Congress further plummeted as a result.62  
The number of treaties for Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, 
meanwhile, can simply be explained by the fact that both presidents did not name 
international trade as an economic priority because they had too many domestic concerns to 
prioritize upon their arrival to the Oval Office. For W. Bush, the September 11th attacks and 
subsequent recession turned his attention away from making international treaties a priority 
publicly. Yet, he obviously intended to continue the initiatives began by his father and 
President Reagan before him, as evidenced by the numerous treaties passed by each of these 
administrations. Obama, too, prioritized passing treaties such as the TPP in the hopes of 
creating long-lasting, positive economic change while in office, but given the immediate 
needs of the 2008 Great Recession, the president did not list these hopes and dreams 
amongst his highest economic priorities. Unfortunately, many Americans also agreed with 
this prioritization of economic policies, and a growing wave of anti-globalization sentiment 
amongst both Democrats and Republicans led to both a desire to redefine the parameters of 
old trade treaties, such as NAFTA, as well as hesitancy to enter into new agreements such as 
the TPP.63 This sentiment not only dashed Obama’s hope of passing the TPP, but also set 
the stage for the protectionist policies advocated by both presidential candidates during the 
election to replace him. 
However, despite this recent wave, it is clear that negotiating treaties can be a very 
successful strategy for presidents wishing to enact long-lasting economic policies. As noted 
 
62 Skidmore, David. 1993. "Foreign Policy Interest Groups and Presidential Power: Jimmy Carter and the Battle over 
Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties." Presidential Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3: 477-97. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551108. 
63 Skonieczny, Amy. 2018. “Emotions and Political Narratives: Populism, Trump, and Trade.” Politics and 
Governance. Vol 6, No 4: 62-72. 
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previously, unlike EOs, they are hard revoke by future administrations because of their 
Senate approval. Additionally, they create wide-sweeping policies, unlike vetoes, that not 
only impact a large number of industries throughout the U.S., but also potentially entire 
regions of the globe. Like appointments, individual treaties can have an outsized impact 
beyond the sheer number of those that are passed, as the Panama Canal, NAFTA, and 
several others demonstrate. Finally, though treaties require a blend of both unilateral power 
in negotiations, and soft power in Senate ratification, the success rates of almost all of the 
presidents in the sample of getting their proposed treaties passed is astronomically high, with 
the odds being in favor of presidents who are seeking to not only have a long-term national 
impact, but a global one as well. 
 
Persuasion and Rhetoric and Coalition Building 
 When presidential achievements are listed, however, it is not the EOs, vetoes, 
appointments, nor even treaties that are often cited first. Rather, a large amount of credit is 
given to the chief executive who is able to sign into law the legislation that embodies the 
campaign promises one made on their way to the White House. Carter’s initial energy 
package, the Reagan and W. Bush tax cuts, the Affordable Care Act are all examples of some 
of these far-reaching legislative victories. Indeed, in terms of longevity, legislation passed 
into law has seemingly the potential to outlive all other presidential policies. Unlike EOs and 
vetoes, laws are extremely hard to revoke by future administrations, as they either take an act 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, or a new law passed by Congress. One need only look at how 
often presidential candidates have run on the slogan of repealing their predecessors 
legislative accomplishments, only to fail at doing so once in office (Republicans’ attempts to 
end the Department Education or the ACA are good examples). Yet, just as it is difficult to 
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align congressional support in revoking past laws, so too is it difficult to gather the necessary 
pieces to pass legislation in the first place, particularly laws that have the potential for long-
term economic impacts. To do so successfully, presidents must rely on one, or both, of the 
soft powers at the disposal of their office: the persuasive power of their platform, and their 
ability to form political coalitions between various interest groups, legislatures, and party 
officials.  
As noted above, James Stimson’s analysis of broader public support for the president 
demonstrated that “[t]he approval accorded to Presidents by the American public is found to 
follow a cyclical pattern over time. All presidents begin their terms with great popularity, 
experience parabolic declines, steadily lose popular support for about three years, and then 
recover some at the end of their terms.”64 In other words, according to Stimson, presidents 
oftentimes have very similar levels of power when it comes to influencing and directing 
public opinion. As can be seen from Table 8, Stimson’s cycle also holds true when taking the 
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However, it is intuitively hard to believe that the charisma and rhetoric of a president 
does not have any impact on president’s potential for success, even if figures on popularity 
do not provide any evidence of such a pattern. It is well-established that then-Senator John 
F. Kennedy won his debate against then Vice-President Richard Nixon because the first 
televised debate captured the young candidate’s appeal to the general public better than his 
opponent.66 Similarly, former-President Donald Trump dominated the news cycle every time 
he posted a Tweet, driving the national conversation towards topics he wanted to discuss 
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Jimmy Carter     
45.5% (6)   
Ronald Reagan   
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George Bush  
60.9% (1) 
 
William Clinton  
55.1% (2) 
 
George W. Bush  
49.4% (4) 
 
Barack Obama  
47.9% (5) 
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and drowning out topics that may harm him politically.67 But does this use of the bully pulpit 
result in any type of policy success, or is the more quiet, subtle nature of coalition building, 
more successful in creating lasting change? 
As shown in the Table 8, President Carter had the lowest average approval rating 
among the public during his time in office. This little amount of public support, combined 
with weak internal resources from an outsider staff he mostly brought with from his days in 
Georgia, reduced Carter’s effectiveness considerably in passing legislation to promote his 
long-term economic agenda, despite the existence of an existing coalition of party allies 
controlling both houses of Congress. Meanwhile, President Reagan was neither the most nor 
least popular president according to Gallup, but his success in utilizing both strong internal 
forces of experienced White House staffers from previous administrations, and the political 
coalitions of the party and special interests created during his campaigns, allowed him to 
have a large influence on Congressional behavior and enact many of his long-term economic 
policies. Most notably, legislation that Reagan was able to push through Congress using 
these soft powers included the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 (his major jobs creation 
program and the first significant enactment of public-private partnerships), the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (which lowered top tax rates), and Social Security reform (which 
increased the Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax to increase the program’s solvency). 
“Reaganomics” is still referenced today by politicians and economists alike due to the long-
term economic policies Reagan successfully enacted using a wide variety of internal and 
external resources and executive powers.68 
 
67 Keith, Tamara. November 18, 2016. “Commander-In-Tweet: Trump’s Social Media Use and Presidential 
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 President H.W. Bush attempted to continue Reagan’s legacy. His efforts, however, 
were unsuccessful despite having much of the same internal resources as his predecessor. 
Instead, like Carter, H.W. Bush was unable to successfully develop and utilize the political 
coalitions necessary to sway the Democratically controlled Congress to pass proposals like 
his federal budgets and its provisions that intended to curb spending. This resulted in H.W. 
breaking his campaign promise for “no new taxes,” and led to a drop of both his political 
capital and popularity over time, despite having the highest overall average level of 
popularity amongst this study’s sample. Having used all of his political capital in passing a 
handful of laws and coordinating the Gulf War, H.W. Bush was unable to push the Senate 
into signing NAFTA, despite his many years of negotiating and signing the massive trade 
agreement.69 It was later ratified under his successor, President Clinton. In short, even with a 
great deal of public support, the lack of a strong coalition in Congress meant H.W. Bush was 
resigned to the same unilateral tactics as Carter that allowed him to bypass opposition, but 
didn’t result in as much long-lasting legislation.  
 President Clinton, like Reagan, came into office during a downturn of the national 
economy and with a platform to reverse this trend. Though the young and inexperienced 
staffers made early mistakes, Clinton’s stirring rhetoric and persuasive tactics allowed him to 
remain one of the most popular presidents in office, even while facing impeachment. 
Clinton used this soft power to his advantage in such legislative achievements as the signing 
of NAFTA and welfare reform. However, an opposition-controlled Congress prevented the 
passage of his healthcare reform package, a major blow to the administration. In response, 
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Clinton had the second highest number of executive orders amongst the presidents; an 
example of his attempts to bypass the politically opposed roadblocks from Congress. 
 President George W. Bush’s goals and methods were quite similar to those of 
Reagan, whose administration he drew on for both staffers and ideas alike. As each of his 
advisors point out, the administration saw a lot of success in getting long-term economic 
legislation passed early in their first term, namely the “Bush” tax cuts and Medicare reform, 
among others. However, as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Harvey Rosen 
discusses, while President Bush was successful in persuading Congress and forming strong 
political coalitions to pass legislation, his and the administration’s attempts at utilizing the 
infamous “bully pulpit” were less successful, particularly in the attempts to reform Social 
Security. According to Rosen, Social Security reform “would have been a higher probability 
of success if the president had been explicit during the 2004 campaign that if he were 
elected, he would pursue Social Security reform.”70 Thus, despite the wide successes in 
establishing several policies that would carry on into his successor’s economy, the 
administration was not successful in all of its endeavors and couldn’t utilize the full powers 
of the presidency before the opposing party took control of Congress. As Rosen continues 
to say, despite the many victories, the losses still haunted both the President and his staff, 
and “[e]veryone was bitterly disappointed that we made no progress on this effort.”71 
 President Obama employed the tactic set forth by Light and utilized the political 
capital gained from his election victories, which saw the rise of strong Democratic political 
coalitions and a large amount of public support for the President. With a Democratic 
majority in Congress, President Obama was able to pass his key legislative goals: the stimulus 
 
70 Rosen, Harvey. Interview #2, Appendix, 2013. 
71 Rosen, Harvey. Interview #2, Appendix, 2013. 
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bill and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Both of these pieces of legislation, as well as 
President Obama’s attempts to reduce forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, have had major 
implications for future economic conditions and will undoubtedly shape the long-term 
economy. However, the rise of Republican opposition and its retaking of the House of 
Representatives, coupled with falling public support and continued economic struggles 
slowed down legislative successes for the Obama administration in his final years in office. 













Table 9 gives us a glimpse of how active Congress was under each president, and 
insight into how successful each president was at creating coalitions to pass laws while 
 












Jimmy Carter    
36,490 0 1,540 (4) 4% (3) 
Ronald Reagan  
48,318 14 2,654 (1) 5% (1) 
George Bush 
23,803 53 1,275 (6) 5% (1) 
William 
Clinton 37,794 121 1,818 (3) 4% (3) 
George W. Bush 
48,572 101 1,830 (2) 4% (3) 
Barack Obama 48,764 111 1,294 (5) 3% (6) 
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serving as head of the Executive Branch. As can be gathered from the analysis above, despite 
the relative consistency in the percentage rate of the number of laws enacted under each 
administration, the Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush presidencies saw similar, and significantly 
larger, numbers of actual laws passed than the one-term presidents, and President Obama. 
Like the analysis of vetoes, appointments, and treaties, the quantitative analysis should not 
overshadow the qualitative importance of the laws that were indeed passed, as is the case 
with the ACA and stimulus bills that were passed under President Obama, despite his being 
ranked at the bottom of the list in the number of laws passed during his terms in office. 
It should be noted, however, that the percent of laws enacted are extremely low, 
especially when compared to the success rate of the deployment of the other powers that 
have been analyzed thus far. Therefore, it is important to remember, that while legislative 
victories deserve a great deal of credit for their potential longevity and widespread influence, 
the amount of time, energy, and political capital compared to the other powers on this list 
call into question their relative value. In some cases, the sacrifices, compromises, and deals 
that need to be made in order to pass legislation may be too high of a cost in the end for 
only marginally impacting the economy in the desired manner. 
 
Summary 
The analyses of each presidency provide examples of both successes and failures in 
creating long-term economic policies, with each administration using a different combination 
of presidential powers and influence to reach those ends. Each president attempted to enact 
policies by using their pools of political capital and persuasive rhetoric early in their 
presidencies to motivate the public and sway congressional members (Reagan’s tax cuts and 
Obama’s healthcare laws were both some of the earliest pieces of legislation passed during 
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their administrations). However, as time went on, most presidents began losing their external 
power in regards to congressional and public support, which slowly ate away at their 
coalition/party building and persuasive powers, and thus almost each of the administrations 
saw an increased use of unilateral actions, such as executive orders and vetoes, as time went 
on. This was especially the case after opposing parties took control of Congress during 
midterms and during their overall second terms (save Carter and H.W. Bush, the only one-
term presidents in this analysis).  
 




 Despite these similarities and trends, there are indeed clear differences between 
presidents and the powers they used to enact long-term economic policy. Those presidents 
that struggled the most in enacting their long-term economic policy goals were often those 
who only served one term and were unable to pass legislation through a hostile Congress, 



















Jimmy Carter 3 6 4 4 17 (5) 
      
Ronald Reagan 1 3 1 5 10 (1) 
      
George Bush 6 4 2 1 13 (3) 
      
William Clinton 2 4 3 2 11 (2) 
      
George W. Bush 4 2 5 6 17 (5) 
      
Barack Obama 5 1 5 3 14 (4) 
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president can use are his coalition and party building capabilities, as well as public 
persuasion. These skills were seen as absent in the Carter and H.W. Bush administrations, 
which not only lacked success in achieving some of their highest legislative priorities, but 
also failed to gain enough support to be elected to a second term. 
 
Table 11: Hybrid Power Usage Rankings  
 
 
Presidents who were not necessarily the most popular, specifically W. Bush, were 
able to overcome their ineffectiveness in generating public support by utilizing previously 
formed political coalitions and experienced staffers from earlier administrations. W. Bush’s 
ability to build congressional support for his nominees and treaties without a strong track 
record of using his “bully pulpit” show that the power of persuasion when used alone is 
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3 1 1 2 7 (1) 
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4 6 5 6 21 (6) 
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goals, and thus a hybrid of soft-skills, when combined with powerful hard skills (such as 
those he gained from a team of strong and experienced nominees and negotiators with a 
great deal of governmental experience) may be the most effective tool a president has to 
create long-term policy change. 
 
Table 12: Soft Power Usage Rankings 
 
 
Similarly, presidents who had strong coalition support in both Congress and special interests, 
such as President Obama, were initially successful in passing desired legislation, but unable 
to sustain these advantages over their entire terms (the 2010 midterms saw an end to 
Democratic control of both the House and Senate). Thus, these tactics are not effective in 
generating continued policy successes throughout one’s entire time in office. President 
Reagan was able to avoid this pitfall, showing his adaptability at not only deploying his hard 

















Jimmy Carter 6 4 3 13 (5) 
     
Ronald Reagan 3 1 1 5 (1) 
     
George Bush 1 6 1 8 (2) 
     
William Clinton 2 3 3 8 (2) 
     
George W. Bush 4 2 3 9 (4) 
     
Barack Obama 5 5 6 16 (6) 
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above. His example further showcases the effectiveness of balance in deploying powers, 
rather than relying on one more than others. Reagan seemingly tackled problems from 
multiple fronts, and doing so allowed him to strategically deploy his political capital rather 
than use it all up on initial legislative victories, as was the case for Clinton and Obama. 
 
 











In truth, the powers that demonstrated the greatest amount of both longevity and 
potential for overall impact were those that were identified as hybrid powers: nominating 
appointees and negotiating treaties. As was seen, these powers, unlike the others, had high 
rates of success, are difficult to overturn by future administrations, and can have a massive 
impact on the economy of both the nation (ex: interest rates set by the Fed) and the world 
(international trade and investment treaties). While nominations rely more on the individual 











Jimmy Carter 5 5 5 15 (5) 
     
Ronald Reagan 1 3 1 5 (1) 
     
George Bush 3 4 2 9 (3) 
     
William Clinton 2 2 2 6 (2) 
     
George W. Bush 5 1 4 10 (4) 
     
Barack Obama 4 6 6 16 (6) 
     
   76 
president who nominated them (a good example of this is the surprise many Supreme Court 
experts expressed when Chief Justice John Roberts upheld the ACA’s individual mandate, 
despite having been nominated by a Republican), international treaties are largely the 
product of a president’s efforts in diplomatic and foreign affairs, as well as coalition building 
at home. The cumulative scores compiled for this analysis bear this out: the presidents who 
showed success in deploying the hard, hybrid, and soft powers rank near the top of the 
overall leaderboard in Table 13, suggesting that all of these skills are necessary for a 
president to enact the long-lasting policies they want to pass. Thus, a president who wishes 
to pursue long-lasting economic policies as part of their legacy should concentrate on 
developing both the hard and soft skills necessary to deploy these powers, particularly hybrid 
powers such as treaty negotiations, as they have the greatest rate of success, and likely 
impact, over time. 
 
Overall Observations 
 This essay sought to answer the question of whether or not presidents have the 
ability to influence the long-term national economy through the office’s policymaking 
powers, and determine which presidents and powers are most effective at enacting such 
policies. Analyses of each presidency showed both successes and failures within each 
administration, as well as uses of each type of power to varying degrees by each president.  
However, those presidents that were capable of utilizing both the hard and soft powers of 
coalition and party building, particularly when ratifying trade and investment treaties, were 
more successful in enacting far-reaching and long-lasting economic policies, though these 
powers were not consistent in creating successes among every presidency. 
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This evidence contradicts the traditional presidential power theories of Schlesinger 
and Neudstant, as success rates were not continually increasing over time as more and more 
power became concentrated in an imperial office of the president, and persuasive presidents 
such as Clinton were less successful at enacting certain policies than less talented users of 
rhetoric and public opinion, such as W. Bush. Indeed, the evidence of presidential success 
actually indicates that long-term economic powers of the president fall in line with 
Skowronek’s theory of presidents being subjects to what he calls “political time,” stating: 
 
It takes more than a new coalition and a new constitutional vision, more than a new 
program bursting with material services and supports with which to develop the 
nation’s economy, more than political sensitivity to public opinion and skill 
manipulating it, but it also takes the correct political time and conditions to act.73 
 
Skowronek’s theory, as this paper showed, points to the political environments a president 
enters office in and serves during as having the greatest impact on their success to enact 
policies, in this case long-term economic ones. Skoworonek attests that political time is 
actually cyclical, and that the most successful presidents come into power during similar 
circumstances, as do those that are the least successful, and all follow identical tracks on how 
their presidencies develop. Those that are the most successful administrations are those that 
enter office during times of revolutionary political regime change, usually from one party to 
another, and often seek to establish new orders in opposition of those that seemingly failed 
in the previous administration, all of which could describe the presidencies of Reagan and 
Clinton. Their direct successors, such as H.W. Bush, can only try to sustain this revolution, 
but often come up shorter than the revolutionaries, as the ability to hold together such 
 
73 Skowronek, Stephen. 1997.The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, 
Revised Edition. Belknap Press. 119. 
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power and influence often wanes over time (Light’s Paradox applied to the long-term). 
Eventually, the regime will fall apart and those trying to hold power during this time will 
often face the task of trying to bridge the fallen regime with the impeding revolution, but 
most fail to reach the levels of support needed to achieve full revolutionary change due to 
the persistence of old guards in place. Finally, a new revolutionary will return and usher in 
the most drastic change seen in the presidency in years, and thus use all of the powers of the 
office to their greatest potentials in enacting desired policies. 
This theory is the best at describing which presidents were successful or not in 
enacting long-term economic changes during their time in office, and though further 
research and testing must be done to verify this claim, the theory and the evidence provided 
from this study does provide a framework to determine which presidents have had and will 
have in influencing the long-term national economy during their presidencies.  
Revolutionaries like Reagan and Clinton not only had the greatest amount of success in 
using their powers of coalition building to enact long-term economic policies, but they both 
displayed the unique circumstances of opportunities in political time that those less 
successful presidents were unable to achieve during their attempts to pass similar legislation. 
Carter could not end inflation, H.W. Bush was unable to continue Reagan’s legacy, and W. 
Bush couldn’t pass Social Security reform all because they were trying to make these things 
happen before the country was ready for the changes to take place. Instead, their efforts 
provided the basic framework for their successors’ achievements, allowing them to draw on 
both the insight and failings of previous attempts and combine them with their own political 
resources to take advantage of a later political time and pass sweeping, revolutionary policies 
that would have an impact on the long-term national economy. 
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Despite this conclusion, however, further work must be done to fully understand the 
impact of these actions by presidents on the long-term economy, whether they are 
intentional or not, and how these policies have truly shaped the nation in the long-term. In 
this next chapter, it will be clear who is responsible, who should receive the credit or blame 
for the state of the nation’s economy at any point in time. Only by completing these analyses 
will there be a clear understanding of the president’s ability to shape the long-term national 
economy, and be able to make informed decisions as voters about candidate potential and 
performance, as well as provide lawmakers with the understanding of how to best create 
policy, and which of these powers should indeed be deployed for creating a strong national 
economy in the long-run. 
  




Impact Imminent  
 






“Change will not come if we wait for some other person, or if we wait for some other time. We 
are the ones we’ve been waiting for. We are the change that we seek.” 
-Barack Obama, Forty-Fourth President of the United States of America 
  
   81 
Actions and Reactions 
 The previous chapters found evidence that presidents have the desire and incentive 
to create policies that will have a long-term economic impact on the nation, and that they 
have a wide-variety of powers at their disposal to enact such policies, particularly ones that 
combine both the hard and soft skills afforded to the office. But what does all of this intent 
and action lead to, if anything? It has already been noted that presidents are only one 
individual in a multi-faceted federal government, which serves over seven million citizens 
and an economy measuring over $20 trillion, and that much of their success in creating 
policy results from the political time upon which they take office. So, do the presidential 
actions that have been analyzed thus far have the impacts their presidents desired, or is “The 
Most Powerful Person in the World” unable to make as much of a difference as voters give 
them credit (or blame) for? 
 Political scientists and economists have long been studying the economic impact of 
presidential policies, especially in the short-term. Clifford F. Thies notes that “the people 
care a lot about the economy,”74 and Mark Zachary Taylor created an “Economic Ranking 
of the US Presidents, 1789-2009” to provide data on where each administration stands in 
regards to historical economic performance.75 But like the political business cycle identified 
by William Norhaus and the many scholars who continued his work, these studies have 
limited their evaluation of economic performance to the time when a president was in office. 
Indeed, even recent breakthroughs in presidential studies, such as Alan S. Blinder and Mark 
W. Watson’s determination that “US economy has performed better when the president of 
 
74 Thies, Clifford. 2014. “Ranking the Presidents: Scholars versus The People,” Academic Questions (Springer 
Nature) 27, no. 1: 79-93. 
75 Taylor, Mark Zachary. 2012. “An Economic Ranking of the US Presidents, 1789-2009: A Data-Based 
Approach.” PS 45 (4) 596-604. 
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the United States is a Democrat rather than a Republican,” a finding they call the 
Democratic- Republican gap (or D-R gap), is contained to only a president’s own term in 
office, plus one single quarter of the following administration.76 Even studies that seek to 
broaden these theories into the long-term, such as Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson’s work on 
the political business cycle and Tim Kane’s extension of the D-R gap into a series of longer 
lag periods, restrict themselves to a single economic measurement for success (income 
inequality for the former, and GDP growth for the latter), thus limiting the full picture of the 
many different ways a president can impact the long-term national economy.  
 What these studies do show us, however, is that whether or not a president is directly 
responsible for the economic health of the nation, the voters will hold him accountable for it 
on election day. Yet, as Gary C. Jacobson pointed out in regards to the 2012 election, which 
president the public chooses to pin economic performance on has shifted: 
The public’s view of the economy was overwhelmingly negative: at the start 
of the election year, 79 percent of Americans had rated the economy as 
“fairly bad” or “very bad,” and 68 percent continued to do so in October. 
And throughout the year, large majorities identified the weak economy as the 
most important national problem and election issue… 
The public also doubted the efficacy of Obama’s policies for dealing with 
economic challenges. His stimulus package (the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009) continued to get at best tepid reviews, although 
not as bad as in 2010; the results of an October 2012 Pew survey were 
typical: just 33 percent of respondents believed that it improved the 
economy, with 35 percent saying it made it worse and 27 percent saying it 
made no difference. On average, during 2012, only 43 percent of Americans 
approved of Obama’s economic management…  
Based on the historical record, economic conditions were clearly a major 
threat to Obama’s reelection. How was he able to survive the threat?...What 
protected Obama from the full force of economic discontent? In a word, 
 
76 Blinder, Alan. S., and Mark W. Watson. 2016. “Presidents and the US Economy: An Econometric 
Exploration.” American Economic Review 106 (4): 1015-45. 
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partisanship…Obama won because, despite the weak economy, he received 
overwhelming approval and electoral support from ordinary Democrats… 
A good part of the reason is that Democrats could and did blame 
someone other than Obama for economic problems: George W. 
Bush…a majority of Americans continued to blame Bush more than Obama 
for economic conditions throughout Obama’s first term…[and] among 
Democrats, however, the margin did not diminish at all.77 
 
 This chapter intends to bring all of the previous findings together in order to close 
the gap in both the public knowledge and existing research. First, the measurements of 
economic well-being used in the evaluation of (LTEI) is identified, in addition to economic 
growth rates as measured by GDP. Once the parameters are set, the comparison is made 
between how presidents have been traditionally evaluated (economic conditions in the short-
term, during their own term), as well as the more recent standard emerging among the public 
(the less well-defined and researched long-term). Following the discussion on overall 
economic performance, the chapter takes a closer look at whether presidents were able to 
achieve their original economic policy goals, and using the analysis on presidential powers, 
determine how they did so. Finally, the analysis concludes by taking a broad look at both 
individual presidential economic performance in the long-term, as well as overall success of 
the office as a whole. 
 
Measures of Success 
 As mentioned above, while some studies, such as Blinder and Watson’s, measure 
multiple economic conditions during a presidential term in office, long-term studies almost 
 
77 Jacobson, Gary C. 2013. “How the Economy and Partisanship Shaped the 2012 [US] Presidential and 
Congressional Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 128 (1): 1-38. 
   84 
exclusively focus on only tracking the economic performance of a president with one 
variable. However, just as presidential powers are multifaceted and able to influence 
policymaking in numerous different ways, so too can it impact different areas of the national 
economy. Thus, for this analysis, the data that experts often cite will be broadened when 
diagnosing the economic health and well-being of the nation. As the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) states, “in recent years there has been a renewed interest in economic 
statistics that go beyond GDP in measuring well-being.”78 Taking the BEA’s lead in their 
own measures of Economic Well-Being, the data sets that will be used for the analysis 
include:  
• Economic Growth as measured by GDP – the most common measurement for a 
nation’s economic well-being Gross Domestic Product (or GDP) measures the total 
value of all the finished goods and services produced within the U.S. 
• GDP Per Capita – GDP per capita standardizes wealth and production levels for 
population, and is often used as a proxy for a nation's standard of living. 
• Real Median Personal Income – similar to GDP per capita, real media personal 
income is adjusted for household size, and provides an inflation-adjusted measure of 
total income received by the "middle" income household, whose income is below 
50% of households and above the other 50% of households. According to the BEA, 
“Real median personal income is a more appropriate gauge of how the U.S. 
economic pie is distributed because it focuses on how income accrues to households 
rather than on GDP, which is a measure of production.”79 
 
78 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
https://apps.bea.gov/well-being/ 
79 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
https://apps.bea.gov/well-being/ 
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• Household Wealth – Measured by net worth (that is, household assets less 
liabilities) household wealth is an important measure of economic health because it 
increases economic welfare by supplementing income for large purchases, 
unemployment, emergencies, retirement, education, and bequests to heirs. 
• Inflation – The rate of increase in prices over a given period of time. The BEA 
claims that “High and variable rates of inflation, can affect economic well-being, 
including eroding the real income and purchasing power of those on fixed incomes 
and more generally transferring income from debtors to creditors.”80 
• Unemployment – The level of nonworking citizens in the U.S. who are still 
searching for and looking to work, but are unsuccessful in doing so. This does not 
include those able to work but who have stopped searching for employment. 
• Overall Trade – The combined levels of both exports and imports. This is not to be 
confused with the national Trade Deficit, the measurement of exports minus the 
level of imports. The Trade Deficit, while useful, has been relatively steady in the 
negative for the time period being looked at in the analysis, and thus does not 
provide a suitable measure for the positive influence a president might have by 
engaging in increased levels of trade. As the BEA states, “trade yields higher growth 
and standards of living,” by “allowing for specialization across nations and raising 
productivity.”81 
• Average Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio During Term – one of the most common 
policy goals of the presidents within the sample, the budget deficit measures the gap 
 
80 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
https://apps.bea.gov/well-being/ 
81 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
https://apps.bea.gov/well-being/ 
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between the federal government’s earnings and spending, in this case, measured as 
against the overall production (GDP) of the nation. Because the federal budget is 
usually established on an annual basis, this measurement does not show in the long-
term analysis of presidential policies, as each president should, theoretically, have the 
sole role as executive each time the budget is created. 
 
Data for each of these categories comes primarily from the BEA, as well as tools provided 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Overall Presidential Performance 
 Before looking at the individual records of each president, we must first look at the 
success of the office in general. Doing so will provides the clarity necessary to discern which 
presidents may have either contradicted or helped move forward this trajectory during their 
own time in office, thus better isolating their individual impacts away from general trends in 
the overall economy and governmental action.  
 For example, as the graph below from the BEA showcases, the general trend of U.S. 
economic growth, as measured by GDP (blue line), has increased over almost consistent rate 
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The only fall from this path came with the 2008 financial crash and the Great Recession that 
followed, but even after that outlier, the trend line of growth resumes only a couple of years 
later. The same trend, though at a lower rate, can be seen for GDP per capita and level of 
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This consistent trajectory brings up two questions of relevance to this study. First, the 
constant growth rate, of around 2% on average, indicates that the presidency, with its 
variance in party and individual holding office over the same time period, either does not 
have much influence on this trajectory, or that individual presidents do not take actions 
differing from their fellows that may have a noticeable impact. This brings up the second 
 
84 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
https://apps.bea.gov/well-being/ 
   90 
question, that if presidents do not have much of an impact on economic growth, but GDP 
as a measurement of economic performance is the main economic measure used in most 
presidential studies, than do these studies provide an accurate picture of which presidents 
had the most influence on the national economy? 
 Some of the additional economic measures clear up some of these questions. A 
look at inflation rates over time, as shown in Graph 5 below, shows variance in its levels 
between presidencies, especially from the beginning of the sample (the 1970s) to the end 
(today).  






85 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
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The same can be said for the variance observed in the trends for unemployment (Graph 
6), international trade levels (Graph 7), and the federal budget deficit (Graph 8). 
 






86 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
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Figure 7: U.S. Trade Levels Over Time87 
 
 
Figure 8: U.S. Budget Deficit Over Time88 
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These variances can be directly attributed to presidential actions identified as being 
within the president’s powers to influence. For example, the drastic changes in inflation can 
be tied to overall fiscal policy by the federal government, particularly the Federal Reserve. As 
noted earlier, the Fed’s large impact on both the short-term and long-term economic 
conditions of the nation is well-documented, with various researchers finding evidence that 
its monetary and fiscal policy “powerfully influences real growth in the short run and 
inflation in the long run.”89 Thus, the president’s naming of Federal Reserve chairpersons 
and board members likely contributed to the differences seen between administrations. 
Similarly, the president’s central role in the federal budget process, from proposal, to 
negotiating with congressional leaders, to signing the eventual bill into law, is the perfect 
example of their coalition building, soft powers. The data from the BEA shows that not all 
presidents used this power, however, to reach the same ends, as the level of the deficit varies 
significantly between administrations. As economists across the political spectrum note: 
Increases in federal budget deficits affect the economy in the long run by 
reducing national saving (the total amount of saving by households, 
businesses, and governments) and hence the funds that are available for 
private investment in productive capital. Deficits thus “crowd out” private 
domestic investment in the long run. Less investment leads to a smaller stock 
of capital and lower output. Lower output and lower national saving lead to a 




89 “The Impact of the Federal Reserve System’s Monetary Policies on the Nation’s Economy.” 1976. 
FRASER, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/impact/HR_94_2_121976.pd
f 
90 Huntley, Jonathan. February 2014. “The Long-Run Effects of Federal Budget Deficits on National 
Saving and Private Domestic Investment.” Congressional Budget Office. 
https://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45140-NSPDI_workingPaper.pdf 
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Thus, the direct actions of the president, in using their soft powers to impact the legislative 
process, could be said to impact the downward trend in net investment and net saving that 
the BEA has identified as having trended downward during the post-WWII era, as shown in 
Graph 9 below. The BEA claims that the “downward trend in net investment has slowed 
growth in U.S. capital stock and capital services, accounting for a large share of decline in 
trend GDP growth.”91 Their report also notes that this has widened for the past 35 years, 
with the net saving rate turning negative in 2008 for the first time since the Great 
Depression. 
 






91 “Prototype Measures of Economic Well-Being and Growth.” 2020. Burea of Economic Analysis. 
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 In short, a look at the trends of economic measures shows that while some 
indicators have maintained steady trends throughout multiple administrations, there is 
evidence that certain trends experience greater volatility over time. Indeed, this conclusion 
strengthens the call for greater investigation into the wider economic impact of presidents 
than simply looking at the most common economic measurements, such as growth in GDP 
while in office. The volatility in indicators such as inflation and net savings can be attributed 
at least in part to the president’s ability to nominate long-serving administrators (deploying a 
hybrid power), and to pass a budget through Congress and thus impact the deficit (deploying 
a soft, collaborative power). This further suggests that presidents able to use a wide variety 
of the powers at their disposal will likely be able to impact the economy in the long-term in 
more numerous ways than those presidents who only, either by choice or circumstance, 
attempt to enact economic policy through a single type of presidential power. 
 
Short-Term 
 In this, as well as the long-term data, this chapter will be looking at the change of 
each economic measure from one point of time to the next in order to quantify what 
progress was made by a president and his team in addressing each of these metrics. For the 
short-term, this means the change from their second year in office to one year after they 
leave the White House. This one year lag helps to account for the inherit delay a new 
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Change in GDP93    +36%  
(3)                
+69% (1) +15% (6) +45% (2) +32% (4) +30% (5) 
Change in GDP Per 
Capita94 
+32% (3) +58% (1) 
 
+11% (6) +34% (2) +24% (4) +24% (4) 
Change in Real Median 
Personal Income95 
-6% (6) +19% (1) -2% (5) +16% (2) -1% (4) +8% (3) 
Change in Household 
Wealth96 
+42% (4) +82% (1) +18% (6) +68% (2) +35% (5) +57% (3) 
Change in Inflation97 -1% (3) +21% (5) -56% (1) -41% (2) +13% (4) +40% (6) 
Change in Unemployment 
Rate98 
25% (5) -45% (2) +14% (4) -23% (3) +60% (6) -54% (1) 
Change in Overall 
Trade99 
+56% (3) +87% (1) +16% (6) +58% (2) +47% (4) +26% (5) 
Average Deficit to GDP 
Ratio During Term100 
+2.3% (2) +4.1% (4) +4.1% (4) +0.1% (1) +3.3% 
(3) 
+4.9% (6) 
Total Scores & Final 
Ranks 
29 (3) 16 (1) 38 (6) 16 (1) 37 (4) 33 (5) 
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Ranks for each category are included in parentheses within each column of Table 14, 
with the aggregate total of each president’s ranking listed on the bottom row, alongside their 
overall ranking in parentheses. The final ranking for greatest overall record is: 
 
1. President Ronald Reagan 
2. President Bill Clinton 
3. President Jimmy Carter 
4. President Barack Obama 
5. President George W. Bush 
6. President George H.W. Bush 
 
Despite the fact that the cumulative scores come from having the best record in each 
area of the national economy, rather than relying on the actual differences between any one 
set of economic standards, the results of the analysis match up closely to previous research. 
President Reagan’s ranked as number one in a majority of the categories, however, he is tied 
with President Clinton for the top overall spot. In his broader list of Economic Grades and 
Presidential Rankings, Mark Zachary Taylor also had Reagan and Clinton neck-and-neck in 
their performance, with other presidents form this sample well behind. Indeed, the gap 
between Reagan and Clinton and the rest of the field in regards to cumulative scores is quite 
significant. 
On the other end of the spectrum, President H.W. not only came in last in the 
cumulative scoring, but also has the most of the lowest scores per category of any 
administration. In the case of inflation, however, President H.W. Bush had the greatest 
success of any administration in lowering the rate during his term. President Obama, on the 
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other hand, suffers from the manner in which this study measures the economic 
performance indicators: by the level of change rather than the aggregate level of inflation 
itself during a president’s time in office. In truth, President Obama’s average level of 
inflation during his entire term was only 1.6%, much lower than the 18% level of inflation 
experienced by President Carter at the end of his term in office. However, the increase in 
inflation from when President Obama took office (1.5%) to when he left (2.1%) creates the 
higher level of change seen in the rankings above. This discrepancy in the data should not 
cause doubt in the findings, however, as presidents in this study, as well as in public opinion 
and any type of performance review, are being measured on how their policies and time in 
office changed the national economy, thus aligning with the units of measurement used here. 
Especially when regarding the long-term, the argument has been that the levels of economic 
well-being a president inherits from a previous administration greatly impact their own 
policies and performance. Therefore, the conditions with which each president is working 
under cannot be removed from the overall measure of their success, and thus the change in 
each economic indicator, rather than their aggregates, are a much better fit for judging 
performance in this context. 
Of note, the Democratic-Republican gap (D-R gap) identified by Blinder and 
Watson exists within the measures of GDP (total Republican score is 11, compared to the 
Democrats better score of 10), the same data point they primarily used in their analysis. The 
gap is slightly more noticeable when using the cumulative score (Republicans total 11, while 
Democrats have a 9 score). Whether their analysis is confirmed or not in the long-term will 
be determined in the next section.  
In short, the findings of overall economic performance for each president in the 
short-term aligns with previous research in this area. However, there is now a consistent 
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baseline by which to compare this level of performance to each president’s long-term record. 
Most importantly, this baseline can be used to identify the changes, if any, that occur within 
each measure of economic well-being, as well as overall economic performance, from the 
short-term to the long-term. 
  
The Long-Term 
 In his testing of the existence of the D-R gap found by Blinder and Watson, Tim 
Kane sought to tackle the lack of the theory’s consideration for the long-term impacts of 
presidential economic policy. Kane cites a recent debate “among political scientists Bartels 
(2008), Campbell (2011, 2012), and Comiskey and Marsh (2012) on this topic,” which 
“found agreement that the lag should be one year or longer based on the historical facts.” 
 
Comiskey and Marsh (2012) write: “We agree with Campbell and Bartels that 
presidents cannot normally be expected to influence the economy in their 
first year in office. For six of the 11 presidencies from 1949 to 2009, no 
major new fiscal policy initiatives were enacted in their first six months in 
office.”101  
 
Kane goes on to list three examples of presidential policies that justify the need to 
incorporate a lag, and judge presidential economic policies in the long-term, rather than the 
short-term. The first two, President Obama’ stimulus and healthcare reform packages, had a 
net impact lag of two and four years, respectively. Some of the delay was caused by structural 
delays of certain activities written into the laws themselves (such as tax incentives), the lack 
of certain infrastructure projects being “shovel ready,” or the Healthcare.gov website being 
 
101 Kane, Timothy. 2017. “Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016.” Economics Working Papers 
17101, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.  
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ready to launch any sooner than it could be built out (over three years after the ACA was 
signed). The final case put forward by Kane were several policies implemented by President 
Carter:  
Perhaps the most interesting case of a structural policy lag is the Carter 
presidency, notably the energy reforms and deregulations that, with a lag of 
years, are credited today with lowering the cost of oil during the 1980s, years 
after Carter had lost re-election. Carter’s deregulation of the airlines and 
communications industry also led directly to long-term revolutions in 
transportation and personal computers and the productivity boom of the 
1980s and 1990s.102  
 
Yet, Kane claims, Blinder and Watson’s discovery of the D-R gap did not account for any 
such considerations, simply using the arbitrary lag of one month into each new president’s 
term (as a point of transition between presidencies) to count towards the previous 
administration’s record. Kane extends the lag to several quarters beyond that point, and even 
years, finding that “the D-R gap peaks with a one quarter lag. After that, the D-R gap 
declines quickly with each lag…[i]t even flips to the Republican favor at six lagged 
quarters.”103 
 Unfortunately, Kane limits his analysis to only studying GDP as a measure of 
economic growth, and does not broaden his lag system to a wider variety of economic health 
indicators necessary to better understand the full scope of presidential impact on the long-
term economy. Indeed, Kane admits this, and says “future work on presidential performance 
is needed,” as his work solely focused on the partisan theories arising in recent studies. His 
reasoning for additional work is the same as the one motivating this research: 
 
102 Kane, Timothy. 2017. “Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016.” Economics Working Papers 
17101, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
103 Kane, Timothy. 2017. “Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016.” Economics Working Papers 
17101, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
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At an April 21, 1961 news conference, President Kennedy famously 
remarked that, “victory has one hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” 
The same might be said of expansions and recessions. Who should get credit 
for the mid-1990s boom? Reagan laid the institutional foundation. Bush 
made the tough fiscal compromise. Clinton cut taxes and put NAFTA into 
effect. All deserve credit, it would seem. But who deserves blame for the 
double-digit inflation of the late 1970s? A case can be made to blame Carter, 
Ford, Nixon, and Johnson.104  
He finishes his work by saying “These examples show that the inconsistent relationship 
between partisanship and ideology is a challenge that blurs the important question of how 
policy affects the economy.”105 Thus, this  fills in this additional knowledge. As was done 
previously in the analysis of the short-term, each measure of economic well-being are 
measured in how it changed over time.  
In this analysis, however, the starting point remains the first year of a president’s 
initial term, but the lag will last four years into the next president’s term. This long of a lag 
may cause some overlap with presidential policies of the new administration, but as noted 
above, many of those take a great deal of time to implement and then take  
effect, suggesting their influence on the economy would come outside a shorter lag.  
Furthermore, four years is the timeframe both President Obama and Gary C. Jacobson  
utilize when discussing the 2012 presidential election, each saying that even four years since  




104 Kane, Timothy. 2017. “Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016.” Economics Working Papers 
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As before, ranks for each category are included in parentheses within each column of 
Table 15, with the aggregate total of each president’s ranking listed on the bottom row, 
alongside their overall ranking in parentheses. The final rankings for greatest overall record 
on all of these economic measures can also be summarized as follows: 
 
7. President Ronald Reagan 
8. President Bill Clinton 
9. President Jimmy Carter 
10. President Barack Obama 
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-23% (5) -23% (1) -4% (4) -10% (3) +40% 
(6) 
-16% (2) 
Change in Overall 
Trade1 




Total Scores & Final 
Ranks 
23 (3) 12 (1) 33 (6) 22 (2) 30 (5) 27 (4) 
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11. President George W. Bush 
12. President George H.W. Bush 
 
Most interesting, it seems that, in general, the overall rankings did not change given the 
additional lag. While almost all presidents had a similar cumulative score to their final tally 
for the short-term, it is President Clinton whose performance fell the furthest, from scoring 
a 15 in the short term to a 22 in the long-term, a seven point drop that moved him out of 
first. Changes in the individual economic measures are also minimal, though the drastic 
change in inflation rates from the short-term (-41%) to the long-term (+22%) might explain 
some of the overall drop experienced by the Clinton administration. Indeed, one of the 
other major changes from the short-term to the long-term analysis was how much President 
Carter improved in lowering inflation levels. Carter’s inflation levels went from only -1% in 
the short-term to -57% when the long-term is considered in the analysis, positioning his 
administration as the one to best handle inflation in the long-term.  
The Democratic-Republican gap, meanwhile, again appears consistent the findings of 
Blinder and Watson. In this analysis, Democrats had a better overall score (9), than their 
Republican counterparts (12), despite President Reagan, a Republican, taking the first spot 
on the overall rankings. Considering that the gap was consistent in the analysis of the short-
term, as well as when considering the long-term, it would seem that economic performance 
under Democrats and Republicans does lead to different results. Yet, the gap may be less 
significant than Blinder and Watson give it credit for, as many Democrats and Republicans 
score both high and low in a variety of the categories observed in this study, with both 
parties contributing to drops in unemployment and inflation (except President George W. 
Bush), as well as growth in GDP, GDP per capita, and median income and household 
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wealth growth (again, except for President W. Bush in regards to median income levels). 
This conclusion is also in line with Tim Kane’s findings, which found a slight advantage for 
Democrats over Republicans when taking a partial lag consisting of overlapping credit for 
each president per quarter. Kane reasoned that the reason for the lack of a D-R gap 
appearing under stricter scrutiny may be because of a simple reason: today’s Democrats and 
Republicans are much different than those of the past:  
Political writers often observe that a Republican (or Democrat) in the White 
House today would have been a Democrat (or Republican) three decades 
ago. Ronald Reagan advocated for greater levels of immigration and signed 
legislation that granted amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants in 1986, a 
policy anathema to conservatives in recent years. Richard Nixon enacted 
wage and price controls, and famously went to China, both decidedly non-
conservative positions. Liberal JFK cut income tax rates at all levels, the first 
president to do so since before the Great Depression, and tax-cutting 
(especially for the rich) is decidedly out of step with modern progressive 
ideology. These examples show that the inconsistent relationship between 
partisanship and ideology is a challenge that blurs the important question of 
how policy affects the economy.107  
 
Therefore, judging the economic impact of presidents by party may not only be 
statistically irrelevant, but also not useful in determining what kinds of actions had a positive 
impact, and which kinds of actions had a negative one, on the national economy. This, rather 
than ranking presidents or parties on their economic performance, is why any member of the 
electorate, media, academy, or government should be interested in learning what kind of 
impact the president can have on the long-term economy: to find practices and policies that 
work, are sustainable, and have positive results in the long-term, and to concentrate on 
pursuing such policies moving forward. 
 
107 Kane, Timothy. 2017. “Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016.” Economics Working Papers 
17101, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
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Policies, Powers, and Performance 
 The analysis has led to the point of determining which presidents achieved their 
intended long-term economic goals, and how did they do so. Did the national economy 
perform according to their stated hopes in the long-term, or were there unexpected 
consequences to either their actions or the lack thereof? To answer these questions, and thus 
find out which presidential powers have shown the greatest success in creating positive 
economic change in the end, each administration must be examined individually. 
 
President Jimmy Carter 
 For a presidency that is known for its struggles with the opinions of both Congress 
and the public, the Carter administration ranks third in the analysis of long-term economic 
success. As was seen in the previous chapter, President Carter suffered from the lowest 
average of public popularity for his term, and despite Democratic majorities in both the 
Senate and House of Representatives, the president continuously lacked support for many of 
his top legislative priorities. Thus, it is even more surprising how this economic success was 
achieved.  
When looking at the rankings for the successful deployment of various powers to 
create long-term policies, Carter ranked next to last in every category, as shown again in the 
comprehensive Table 16 below. Yet, Carter ranks third in the overall long-term economic 
performance rankings, only behind the presidencies of Reagan and Clinton, who are also the 
top ranked administrations for effective use of long-term powers.  
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 So how did Carter do it? As was discussed before, it was not through his unilateral 
actions. In his attempt to meet his goals of reducing government deficits and increase 
bureaucratic efficiency, Carter signed Executive Order 12044 in 1978, which directed 
agencies to review existing regulations and determine whether or not they should be 
retained, modified, or repealed—a process known as retrospective regulatory review.108  
 
Table 16: Long-Term Policy Use and Long-Term Economic 
Performance Rankings for Each President 
 
 
Yet this EO, like so many others of Carter’s, was immediately overridden by President 
Reagan’s own. One month into his own presidency, Reagan signed Executive Order 12291, 
which, according to a report by the Congressional Research Service, “implemented a scheme 
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Jimmy Carter 5 5 5 15 (5) 3 
      
Ronald Reagan 1 3 1 5 (1) 1 
      
George Bush 3 4 2 9 (3) 6 
      
William Clinton 2 2 2 6 (2) 2 
      
George W. Bush 5 1 4 10 (4) 5 
      
Barack Obama 4 6 6 16 (6) 4 
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that arguably asserted much more extensive control over the rulemaking process.”109 Thus, 
Carter’s EO did not have any longevity itself. Additionally, its lack of requiring a cost-benefit 
analysis as part of its reporting limited its impact in actually curbing inefficient behaviors by 
federal agencies, such as considering alternative regulatory options, and thus had a minimal 
impact on Carter’s ability to curb any long-term economic inefficiencies of the federal 
government. Likewise, as was discussed previously, Carter’s attempt to prevent the repeal of 
his oil import fee resulted in a veto override by the Democratically controlled Congress, a 
loss The Washington Post described as “his most humiliating defeat so far on Capitol Hill.”110 
Thus, it was not the use of hard, unilateral powers that allowed Carter’s policies to both 
survive into later administrations and have long-term economic consequences. 
 In truth, it is Carter’s success partnering with Congress to pass sweeping legislation 
that has had the largest impact on the former president’s legacy. While his second energy 
package failed because of Congress’s veto override, Carter had previously succeeded in 
passing his first energy package, a set of laws passed by Congress that included the 
establishment of the Department of Energy, the Emergency Natural Gas Act (which would 
authorize the national government to allocate interstate natural gas), and the Energy Security 
Act. According to the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, while the OPEC oil cartel and 
Iranian crisis led to skyrocketing prices as the pump (and the infamous lines for people to fill 
their tanks with gas) during his term, the legislative victories had long-term impacts on both 
the energy sector and economy overall: 
 
109 Chu, Vivian S., and Todd Garvey. April 16, 2014. “Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and 
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The deregulation of oil and natural gas prices that resulted would lead to a 
vast increase in the supply of energy in the 1980s, and consequently a 
lowering of prices… 
Consumption of foreign oil did go down, from 48 percent when Carter took 
office to 40 percent in 1980 [short-term impact], with a reduction of 1.8 
million barrels a day. When Carter left office there were high inventories of 
oil and a surplus of natural gas, delivered by a more rational distribution 
system. There was greater oil exploration than before, leading eventually to 
an oil glut and a drop in prices-which Carter's Department of Energy had not 
predicted. Between 1980 and 1985, domestic production would increase by 
almost 1 million barrels a day, while imports of crude oil and petroleum 
products declined from 8.2 to 4.5 million barrels a day [long-term impact].111  
 
Likewise, as noted before, President Carter’s appointment of Paul Volcker as the 
Federal Reserve Chairman had a similar impact on national inflation levels. Like energy 
prices, however, inflation rates during the Carter administration were astronomically high, 
and the president ranks in the middle of our sample in terms of change in inflation during 
each presidency (and by far the highest average of inflation in real terms of any president 
within the sample). Yet, when taken in the long-term, like his energy policies, the changes 
the Carter administration put into place had a noticeable and positive impact on the 
economy, reducing, rather than growing, inflation over the longer timeframe, and thus rising 
in the presidential rankings to the top spot.   
Thus, it is clear that when taken in the long-term, the full economic impact of 
President Carter’s policies can be seen as even more positive than when looking at the short-
term alone. However, that is not to say that the political struggles the Carter administration 
faced did not have any consequences at all. As was discussed, when faced with an 
uncooperative Congress and falling public support, Carter’s attempts to act unilaterally 
through EOs and vetoes failed to both create longevity in either the policies themselves or 
 
111 Strong, Robert A. 2021. “Jimmy Carter: Domestic Affairs.” University of Virginia’s Miller Center. 
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their economic impacts. This suggests again that hard powers alone are not the best route 
for establishing long-term change, and that at least some soft-power skills are required by 
presidents wishing to accomplish their long-term economic goals. In Carter’s case, his 
inability to continue his early legislative successes, and passing even more laws that could 
have had a positive long-term impact on the economy (such as his second energy package), 
may be the reason why he is not at the top of the rankings, or one of the presidents in the 
sample who was successfully elected to a second term. 
 
President Ronald Reagan 
 President Reagan’s original list of economic goals was much shorter than President 
Carter’s, but both in the short- and long-term, Reagan was able to achieve many of these 
goals through a balanced flood of all the powers a president has at his disposal, rather than 
relying on one single tactic. In truth, the analysis shows that not only does the Reagan 
administration rank at the top of both the short-term and long-term rankings for economic 
performance described above, but also in the overall deployment of the various powers 
afforded to the Commander in Chief, ranking first in both hard and soft power usage and 
longevity. This correlation is the greatest amount of evidence found in this study that a 
balanced approach of the powers afforded to the president, consistently deployed 
throughout one’s term, is the best path a president can take in creating lasting economic 
change. 
 A deeper dive into the analysis helps clarify this conclusion. President Reagan not 
only sits at first in the overall rankings of the types of powers used by each president, but is 
also the leader in the overall number of executive orders issued, the number of vetoes signed 
by a president, the number of judicial appointments, and the number of laws successfully 
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passed during his term. The sheer vastness of each of these policy areas, each falling into a 
different category of hard, hybrid, and soft-powers at the president’s disposal, likely helped 
launch Reagan to the top of the rankings in each area, as well as his overall impact on the 
economy.  
Yet, though President Reagan is remembered fondly by the public today, especially 
among Republicans, the Gipper did not have the highest average rate of popularity while in 
office, coming in at only third in the sample of presidents. While a talented speaker, this 
suggests that Reagan’s policies were not simply the result of his stirring rhetoric or use of the 
infamous bully pulpit. As noted earlier, the former governor could also have easily fallen into 
the same trap as Presidents Carter and Clinton by attempting to be an outsider, bringing in a 
staff from outside of Washington, and thus trying to change the political landscape through 
new methods and people rather than from within the system. However, Reagan was not new 
to national politics when he stepped into the Oval Office, having already testified before 
Congress during the HUAC Hollywood hearings, chairing the Republican Governors 
Association, and having run for a president four years before he entered office. While not 
the same as having served in Congress, Reagan had experience working with politicians 
across the country, and was willing to build on those relationships in order to achieve his 
goals. While Carter and Clinton, as was described earlier, struggled to navigate the federal 
legislative process due to their devotion to their “outsider” and “new kid” images, President 
Reagan built the coalitions necessary, both in Congress as well as the public at large, to 
support his policies, both unilateral and collaborative. 
Reagan did not waste time in deploying his coalition or powers to achieve his stated 
economic goals, either. As noted earlier, a month into his presidency, President Reagan had 
signed EO 12291, revoking Carter’s earlier policy and requiring agencies to perform a cost-
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benefit analysis on their programs. While like Carter, this EO was eventually modified and 
finally revoked by future presidents of the opposing political party (providing further proof 
that EOs are not the most long-lasting of presidential tools), the rule lasted into his 
immediate successor’s term, and thus counts towards the long-term in this study. As 
reported by the Congressional Research Service: 
In practical effect, the impact of the Reagan orders on agency regulatory 
activities was immediate and substantial. Under the order, OIRA reviewed 
over 2,000 regulations per year and returned multiple rules for agency 
reconsideration. The practical effect of this rigorous review process was to 
sensitize agencies to the regulatory agenda of the Reagan Administration, 
largely resulting in the enactment of regulations that reflected the goals of the 
Administration.112 
 
Similarly, Reagan not only achieved his goal of regulatory reform in his first year in 
office, but also his reduction of the tax burden, with the passage of the Economic Recovery 
Act of 1981 (the Kemp-Roth Tax Cut) massively decreasing the federal income, estate, 
capital gains, and corporate taxes. Dr. Murray Weidenbaum, Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers to President Reagan, explained these actions: 
 
We issued in February 1981 a detailed plan of action (Reaganomics).  The 
main tools were tax cuts, spending cuts, and regulatory reform.  Aside from 
regulatory reform, most of the plan required congressional approval…[so] 
the major “tools” were presidential speechmaking and working with 
Congress. 
 
Every change was objected to by one interest group or another.  Key 
administration officials testified before congressional committees and worked 
with members and their staffs. 
 
[In the end], on balance, there was a general belief that President Reagan had 
made a big and lasting difference.  Inflation was the public’s #1 concern 
when he took office.  It has not been a serious problem since.  His successful 
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effort at across-the-board tax cuts has been followed since.  The budget 
deficits were not planned, but they have been greatly exceeded since.113 
 
Though there have been many conversations surrounding the overall impact of 
“Reaganomics,” the analysis shows that the president’s strategy, to not solely rely on 
unilateral action, but deploy EOs and vetoes alongside efforts to gain public support and 
allies in Congress, proved successful. In both the short-term and the long-term 
measurements, Reagan ranks number one in the analysis, and achieved almost all of his 
stated policy goals.  
 However, there is one data point that might explain at least some of President 
Reagan’s long-term economic success, which greatly increased GDP, household wealth, and 
trade over the short-term gains. Unlike every other president in this study’s sample, Reagan 
is the only one who was succeeded by a member of not only his own party, but of his own 
administration. Thus, most of the policies he enacted, though some would later be 
overturned by Presidents Clinton and Obama, lasted for another four years past his own 
time in office. No other president since has had such a luxury, and credit should again be 
given to President Reagan for his own efforts in ensuring this scenario. Unlike many 
presidents, Reagan left office with an increase in his public opinion rating, approval reaching 
68% by the end of his second term, ten points higher than his yearly average. This popularity 
likely contributed to the electoral win of his vice president, who would carry on many of 
Reagan’s policies and priorities, thus again showing that the coalition building and use of the 




113 Weidenbaum, Murray. Interview #5, Appendix, 2013. 
   113 
President George H.W. Bush 
 Unfortunately for President George H.W. Bush, it is hard to sustain such coalitions 
and public popularity for even two presidential terms, let alone another four to eight years. 
Bush’s inability to hold the coalition together, and losing the public’s trust in him when he 
went back on his promise of “no new taxes” likely led to his relatively lackluster economic 
performance. Though like his predecessor, President H.W. Bush benefited greatly from a 
long-term consideration of his policies vs. his short-term accomplishments, he still ranks at 
or near the bottom in several categories, and does not achieve the highest rankings in any 
category in the long-term consideration. Yet what makes this surprising is how high H.W. 
Bush performed in the analysis of his deployment of presidential powers to create long-term 
policies, in which he ranks third, behind only Presidents Reagan and Clinton. How could 
H.W. Bush be so successful in creating long-term policies, but not have as much of a 
positive impact on the national economy? 
 What must be first understood is that though H.W. Bush ranks at a lower level than 
other presidents in the sample, the economic analysis actually indicates he accomplished 
many of the policy goals he had listed in his set of priorities, even if the overall impact of 
these policies was much smaller when compared to his counterparts. For instance, H.W. 
Bush did indeed experience lower levels of inflation and higher levels of trade during his 
time in office, as well as for the years afterward that constitute the long-term. And though he 
increased taxes in direct contradiction with both his goals and his campaign promises, 
signing the legislation led to a decrease in the federal budget deficit, which, as noted earlier, 
increased long-term saving, investment, and innovation within the national economy.  
 When critiquing the economic effectiveness of the H.W. Bush administration, it is 
not that the president didn’t complete his goals, but rather how his accomplishments 
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compare to his potential success. There is no greater example of this potential than the 
passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). Though recent analysis has 
stirred debate on whether the benefits of the trade agreement outweigh the costs, experts 
across the political spectrum agree that the treaty had a significant impact on the U.S. 
economy. Yet, despite having spent the time, political capital, and energy to negotiate 
NAFTA and get it signed, President H.W. Bush did not get to see its impact in either the 
short-, nor long-term, because he was not the president who actually ratified the treaty. 
Instead, President Clinton was the one who had it passed by the Senate (with additional 
amendments reflecting his own policy priorities) and put into effect. Likely the struggles of 
the H.W. Bush administration in holding together a coalition with both Congress and the 
general public is partly to blame for the slow negotiation process, and ultimate hesitation the 
Senate had in considering the treaty even after H.W. Bush signed it. Instead, Congressional 
Democrats waited for a president from their party to take office so that they could add in 
protections for labor unions and other constituents, and thus also give the positive economic 
impacts of the treaty to a member of their own party. Had H.W. Bush been able to not only 
use his hard power of negotiation, but also his soft power of working with the opposition, 
he may have seen his economic measures rise significantly to match his policy efforts. 
Instead, his successor benefited greatly from President H.W. Bush’s inability to pass the 
treaty. 
 
President Bill Clinton 
 In both the deployment of powers and their impact on both the short- and long-
term national economy, President Bill Clinton only trails President Reagan in his rate of 
success, and the two administrations stand high above the other presidents in this sample. 
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Clinton did not score the highest in any individual category of the various presidential 
powers, but his efforts across the board allowed him to obtain several of the high rankings in 
creating economic change. Even more amazing, the “Comeback Kid” accomplished all of 
this while also experiencing huge political losses in the forms of failed healthcare legislation, 
an opposition-controlled Congress, and an impeachment trial.  
 Like Reagan, some of Clinton’s success comes from the sheer volume of the various 
powers his administration deployed while in control of the White House. Again, though he 
did not rank first in any one category of power usage, he did have significantly more EOs 
than any presidency besides Reagan, one of the highest success of vetoes not being 
overridden, and the second highest number of trade treaties signed, all of which are much 
higher than the next president on each list. Clinton had originally attempted to follow a 
traditional path of passing sweeping legislation early in his term by using the political 
momentum he accumulated during the election. However, like Carter before him, Clinton’s 
team was mostly made up of Washington-outsiders, and the early stumbles of his presidency 
are often attributed to his staff’s lack of experience or inability to navigate the D.C. 
backrooms of policymaking. Having not won a majority of the votes in the national election 
that put him in the White House, Clinton’s already shaky public support also dropped 
astronomically in the first weeks of his initial term. These circumstances are likely part of the 
reason the president failed to utilize his bully pulpit successfully in pushing forward the 
healthcare reform package he had made a major part of legislative agenda, and eventually led 
to the flipping of the House of Representatives to Republican control for the first time in 
forty years.  
So how was President Bill Clinton so successful in creating long-term economic 
change, and leave office with the highest approval rating of any president since 1945? Along 
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with the sheer volume and diversity of the powers his administration utilized throughout 
their time in the White House, Clinton should also be given credit for using his various 
powers in some of the most thoughtful and creative manners of any presidency analyzed in 
this sample. For example, Clinton may have used the veto power more effectively than any 
other president when he vetoed the Republican-sponsored federal budget and spending bill 
that led to the governmental shutdown of 1995-1996. Following public opinion that 
Republicans were responsible for the furlough of hundreds of thousands of federal workers, 
as well as the freezing of many governmental services, congressional leaders eventually 
accepted Clinton’s budget proposal. Many agree that this political victory not only gave 
Clinton a win on some of his key issue areas, but also led to his reelection in the fall of 1996. 
In fact, Clinton’s ability to accomplish another one of his original policy goals, deficit 
reduction, was one of the greatest political and economic victories of his administration. The 
Clinton administration was by far most successful at reducing the deficit, for several years 
even creating a surplus. Though this proved to be unsustainable for future presidents, the 
long-term increases in private saving and investment associated with federal deficit reduction 
likely contributed to the sustained economic growth in the many years following Clinton’s 
administration, even helping the economy to bounce back following some of the worst 
recessions the country has faced since the Great Depression. 
Another possible explanation for Clinton’s outstanding long-term impact and his 
ability to accomplish the economic goals identified in the first chapter may simply be a 
matter of timing. As was discussed previously, Stephen Skowronek’s political timing theory 
holds a great deal of weight in explaining which presidents were most successful in pushing 
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their agendas forward during their time in office.114 That is certainly the case for Clinton’s 
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had been negotiated 
and signed by the previous administration of President George H.W. Bush, but not ratified 
and put into law until Clinton came to the White House. The treaty, along with large number 
of other trade and investment agreements the Clinton administration passed into law during 
his time in office (72, the second highest in the sample), are likely the direct contributors to 
the high levels of trade experienced by the Clinton team in both the short-term and long-
term analysis. Additionally, these efforts did not seem to have the negative impacts on 
unemployment or wage levels that those opposed to NAFTA and other trade agreements 
predicted would be the case, as evidenced by the high levels of both of these economic 
measures during the short- and long-term analysis under Clinton. Indeed, scholars Mary E. 
Burfisher, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder found in their study, “The Impact of 
NAFTA on the United States,” that “both the U.S. and Mexico benefit from NAFTA, with 
much larger relative benefits for Mexico. NAFTA also has had little effect on the U.S. labor 
market.”115 
 
President George W. Bush 
 As noted, the years following the Clinton administration were some of the hardest 
for the national economy since the Great Depression, and it shows in the rankings of overall 
economic success in the long-term. Coupled with that reality, however, was a growing 
partisan divide in the national political arena that has persisted into the present. The 
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administrations of both President George W. Bush and Barack Obama fell prey to these 
difficult times in both the economic and political cycles, and yet, were able to still 
accomplish several of their stated goals and impact the long-term national economy in 
various ways. 
 President George W. Bush ranks in the lower half the sample in terms of both short-
term and long-term economic impact. This is reflective of his standing as fourth in overall 
effective use of the various presidential powers. Unlike Presidents Carter and Clinton, W. 
Bush came into office with a large amount of experience on his staff and cabinet, whose 
members consisted of a number of former Republican bureaucrats from his father’s and 
President Reagan’s administrations. It was likely because of this experience that W. Bush had 
as much success as he did, given that he also faced the tragedy and fallout of the September 
11th terrorist attacks in his first year in the White House. Continuing Clinton’s aggressive 
trade policy, W. Bush ranks number one in the analysis for the total number of trade and 
investment treaties signed. Though the total change in trade during the long-term is only 
ranked at number four in the sample, W. Bush’s overall increase in trade is still far greater 
than that of his successor.  
 Mr. Allan Hubbard, Director of the National Economic Council to President Bush, 
noted there were several successes and failures of the W. Bush administration in reaching the 
economic policy goals, including “[t]he tax cuts of 2001 & 2003, Medicare D, several trade 
acts, and energy policies, all of which we were successful in enacting. We also attempted 
social security reform, immigration reform, and healthcare reform, all of which were not.”116 
Indeed, the reform of Medicare was an accomplishment of one of W. Bush’s primary 
economic goals from the start of his term and was accomplished, according to Hubbard, 
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through “[l]egislative lobbying mostly. Medicare was very successful using this method to 
pass and then implement, while HHS Secretary Levitz helped by doing an education 
campaign on the road to gain public support for it as well.”117 Deploying Levitz was indeed a 
smart tactic by W. Bush, as many in the media and public have claimed the president himself 
lacks the level of skill in speaking and rhetoric found in some of the other presidents in this 
study’s sample. Allowing Levitz to stand in for his bully pulpit ensured that the president was 
not conceding this powerful tool even though his detractors did not think he was capable of 
wielding it himself. 
 Finally, W. Bush was able to achieve one of his other main policy goals through 
legislative action as well: by passing the “Bush Tax Cuts,” the largest tax reductions since the 
Reagan administration. According to Hubbard, the tax cuts and all of the other policy 
successes of the W. Bush administration were successful in securing their longevity and 
positive impact on the national economy: 
 
Were able to establish lower tax rates that allowed for more money in the private 
sector and President Obama could not undo it, trade deals increased free trade, 
and Medicare Part D gave seniors better access to needed drugs and proved that 
a free-market system works with 30% less than projected costs for the changes.118 
 
 Yet, despite these successes, the overall impact of the W. Bush administration is 
dampened by the many policy goals they did not reach. Dr. Harvey S. Rosen, Chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers to President W. Bush, notes what every single advisor 
interviewed for this study said was the greatest missed opportunity by the W. Bush team: 
 
 
During my tenure on the CEA, the policy that would have had the greatest long-
term impact on the national economy was the reform of the Social Security 
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system.  Social Security is actuarially unsound, and the purpose of the proposal 
was to put it on a firm long-term financial basis.119 
 
 
Rosen notes that the reason for the failure of Social Security reform where Medicare had 
succeeded lies in the growing environment of political partisanship that had begun during 
the Clinton impeachment process, and gained momentum following the growing frustration 
and fatigue of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. “During the Bush administration, like now, 
the political atmosphere in Washington was poisonous,” Rosen says, “and Democrats, as 
well as their political allies, were not willing to do anything that would give the 
president a victory.”120  However, Hubbard notes that it was not always Democrats who 
were to blame for the lack of progress on several of W. Bush’s key policy focuses: 
 
Challenges from 2005 to 2006 often resulted from Democratically controlled 
Congress who blocked privatizing Social Security. Ironically, it was 
Republicans who blocked immigration reform, and both parties were 
reluctant to tackle healthcare reform, leaving no traction for the 
administration who had only a few supporters in the Senate (Republicans 
were not ready for such a political issue and Democrats were not helpful).121 
 
Indeed, just as his father had struggled to maintain political support for his initiatives 
in the long-term, W. Bush could not hold together the coalitions necessary to 
complete all of his policy goals, including the Republicans and special interests that 
had, and would again, propel him to win the presidential election. 
 Part of the blame may lie in the type of change W. Bush was hoping to 
achieve. While Medicare reform and tax cuts had both short- and long-term effects 
that could be immediately felt by the public, Social Security reform was not as clear-
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cut. Rosen notes that the W. Bush administration sought the policy change because 
“the program was not on a viable long-term financial path.”122 The only problem was 
politicians were still operating in the short-term calculus, where “members of 
Congress are not inclined to make any difficult political decisions unless they are 
confronted with an immediate crisis.” Ironically, W. Bush’s policies (or failure to 
pass certain legislation) is the catalyst for this investigation into what the long-term 
economic impact of presidents is on the national economy, and it is partly because 
Congressional members were not considering the long-term that W. Bush was 
unable to create policies that may have helped the national economy in those terms.  
 However, even with these disappointments, there is a bright side. Besides the 
changes in unemployment and median income levels (which are not small and shouldn’t be 
discounted), the overall impact of President W. Bush’s policies had a positive impact on the 
national economy in the long-term analysis. From a policy standpoint as well, failures to pass 
Social Security reform were not a total loss. According to Keith Hennessey, Director of the 
National Economic Council to President Bush: 
 
Some of our goals were enacted into law and will likely remain in place for a 
long time.  Others were successful at the time but have been modified or 
repealed since President Bush left office.  Still others, like Social Security 
reform, were not enacted or even considered legislatively when they were 
proposed by President Bush, but that doesn't mean they were unsuccessful.  I 
am confident they will serve as models for future legislation, so we were 
laying the groundwork for a future debate.123 
 
In other words, Hennessey points out that the long-term impacts of any presidential action, 
whether successful in the moment or not, are capable of influencing future administrations, 
 
122 Rosen, Harvey. Interview #2, Appendix, 2013. 
123 Hennessey, Keith. Interview #4, Appendix, 2013. 
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and thus having a lasting impact on the national economy beyond that of the president who 
originally proposed them. 
  
President Barack Obama 
 It was President Obama’s claims during the 2012 presidential race that the longevity 
of his predecessor’s policies that excused the slow progress made in improving the economy 
during his first term in office. Unfortunately, when taken into account, President Obama 
only fairs slightly better than President George W. Bush in leaving a robust economy for his 
successor. And as noted before, by measuring the change in each economic area, rather than 
aggregate totals, each president is judged on the merits of how they impacted the economy 
no matter what the previous administration may have done to negatively impact it 
beforehand. This begs the question: how did President Obama, who arguably passed some 
of the most groundbreaking pieces of legislation in the modern era, not have a better 
economic performance? 
 First, it is important to recognize that President Obama did indeed enter office 
during the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. And despite his poor 
ranking in this analysis, the fact that his administration not only passed significant legislation, 
but also created positive change in several economic well-being indicators (notably change in 
median personal income and household wealth) under such circumstances should be 
commended. As Dr. Austan Goolsbee, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to 
President Obama, put it: 
 
Many goals were reached and the most important—that we not have another 
great depression—will be remembered by historians forever as a very substantial 
accomplishment. The financial and economic hit to the economy was larger than 
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the one in 1929 so it could easily have been just as bad or worse as the 
experience of the 1930s had the financial system collapsed.124 
 
Indeed, when looking at the economic policy goals Obama outlined in his initial Economic 
Report of the President, the administration successfully accomplished several of their goals, 
even if the long-term economic indicators suggest their impact was not as positive as the 
Obama team had hoped they would be. In addition to the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act to reform healthcare, the president also successfully passed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 to help stimulate the economy following the housing bubble and 
global financial collapse. In terms of financial reform, Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which went into effect in 2010. In addition to 
overhauling the U.S. financial regulatory system, the legislation also broadened the 
president’s appointment power in its creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  
Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen stated that “[t]he balance of research suggests that 
the core reforms we have put in place [through the Dodd-Frank Act] have substantially 
boosted resilience without unduly limiting credit availability or economic growth.”125 Finally, 
though partisanship had stalled any victories on Capitol Hill, President Obama deployed his 
unilateral powers by spearheading the Paris Climate Agreements, achieving his goal of 
environmental protection. 
 Yet, similar to President George W. Bush before him, President Obama’s early 
victories quickly gave way to partisan division that completely stalled further legislative 
action during his time in office. Despite the passage of the stimulus bill, President Obama 
was unable to push through the 2011American Jobs Plan (resulting in the second lowest 
 
124 Goolsbee, Austan. Interview #1, Appendix, 2013. 
125 Yellen, Janet L. August 25, 2017. “Financial Stability a Decade After the Onset of the Crisis.” Federal 
Reserve. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20170825a.htm 
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unemployment scores in the analysis), and constant showdowns with the Republican-
controlled Congress led to multiple budget stalemates and government shutdowns, dashing 
Obama’s goal of deficit reduction, which grew to an average of 4.9% to GDP ratio, the 
highest of the sample. According to Goolsbee:  
 
Main roadblocks were two: 1) internally, economists often had disagreements 
over the nature and progress of the economy—like in 2010 trying to decide if the 
economy was sufficiently recovered that it made sense to start cutting the deficit 
in the short-run or not or whether to save the auto industry with a bailout in 
2009, 2) externally, the rise of Republican opposition in Congress seemingly 
intent on opposing anything the president supported. It's pretty hard to do 




Notice the similarities in Goolsbee’s assertion that Republicans were not willing to 
support President Obama on anything with Harvey Rosen commented that “Democrats, as 
well as their political allies, were not willing to do anything that would give the 
president a victory.”127  Both administrations fared similarly in losing their ability to pass 
legislation following the midterm elections during their first terms in office, which saw the 
opposing party gain control of the legislature. Perhaps passing such controversial legislation 
at the beginning of one’s term, when presidents believe they have the most political capital 
to do so, is not the wisest decision, as it may jeopardize one’s ability to continue passing 
legislation throughout the rest of their term, causing them to rely on less effective, and more 
unilateral powers.  
Indeed, President Obama took this route, and his failures in these areas likely 
contributed to his low ranking in the economic analysis. Because the Paris Climate 
 
126 Goolsbee, Austan. Interview #1, Appendix, 2013. 
127 Rosen, Harvey. Interview #2, Appendix, 2013. 
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agreements were not a Senate-approved treaty, Obama’s successor, Republican President 
Donald Trump, was able to exit the agreement without seeking any Congressional input. 
Likewise, Obama’s ability to nominate various judicial and administrative positions 
(including with the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) faced 
unprecedented hurdles put in place by Republicans unwilling to approve any of the 
president’s candidates, resulting the lowest numbers of approved judicial and long-serving 
appointees of any two-term president in this analysis. Thus, the inability to build coalitions 
not only impacted President Obama’s soft-powers, but even his hybrid and hard powers as 
well, likely contributing to his low ranking in the deployment of powers as well.  
The consequences of this divide cannot be understated. As Goolsbee concludes: 
 
…[I]'s clear that the recovery has been slow and extended and the job market 
remains deeply scarred with a long way to go before it could be considered a 
complete success.128 
 
If taking the approach used in analyzing President George H.W. Bush’s economic success, 
looking at his actual accomplishments compared to his potential for accomplishing even 
more, it is clear that despite the successes of the Obama administration, the relatively poor 
economic performance suggests that different tactics may have been advisable in order to 
achieve even greater positive impacts. Increasing partisanship and political division, 
particularly present in the most recent administrations, has a demonstratable negative impact 
on presidents’ abilities to enact long-lasting polices, as well as have a positive impact on the 
long-term economy. If presidents are to return to even higher levels of economic 
performance, and avoid further falls into decline, it is likely necessary that a president must 
increase their soft skills and work to collaborate with both allies and foes alike. 
 
128 Goolsbee, Austan. Interview #1, Appendix, 2013. 






 By taking into account the long-term impact of presidential policies on multiple 
economic measures of well-being, it is clear that presidents do indeed have an impact on the 
national economy for years beyond their own time in office. While the overall effectiveness 
of each administration over the long-term is seemingly identical to their overall performance 
in the short-term, marginal changes in the rankings of each president within the various 
categories of economic change, as well as the movement of President Clinton’s score from 
the short- to the long-term, provide evidence to the fact that long-term analysis is important 
in understanding the full scope of a president’s impact and success. Furthermore, when 
looking at the economic measures in this study over the entire time period (1976 – 2020) 
without separating for each presidential administration, this study finds that there has been 
an overall positive trajectory for the U.S. economy in the long-run (save for the small 
increase in inflation and the large increase in the federal budget deficit): 
 
  
   127 
Table 17: Long-Term Economic Change Across All Presidents 
  
What this analysis finds when the long-term economic performance by each 
president in this study’s sample is broken down, there is a consistent pattern for why certain 
administrations are successful in not only having a positive impact on the national economy, 
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Economic Measure  
Change in GDP129 +1,108% 
Change in GDP Per Capita130 +638% 
Change in Real Median Personal 
Income131 
+21% 
Change in Household Wealth132 +1,896% 
Change in Inflation133 -76% 
Change in Unemployment Rate134 +5% 
Change in Overall Trade135 +1,527% 
Average Deficit to GDP Ratio136  +55% 
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but a substantially large one. The administrations of Presidents Reagan and Clinton had the 
best performances by any of the ones studied by far. Upon further analysis, there is evidence 
to believe that this success came from these presidents’ efforts in pushing their policies 
forward through a substantially large number of proposals, all of which come from a variety 
of powers offered to the Office of the President. These presidents were also not only able to 
create a coalition necessary for upholding and passing these policies, but also in either 
sustaining this coalition across a majority of their term, or constantly rebuilding new 
collaborations through the unique deployment of their various powers (Reagan’s breaking of 
the air traffic controller strike, Clinton’s veto of the 1995-1996 budget and handling of the 
subsequent governmental shutdown) so that they left office more popular and powerful than 
any other president of the modern era. President Reagan also benefited from the fact that 
this coalition and popularity building resulted in the election of his own vice president as his 
successor, effectively cementing many of his top policy achievements into the long-term 
fabric of U.S. policy, and thus, economic impact.  
 On the other side, the performances of the other presidents show that while not 
following these examples won’t necessarily result in achieving some of one’s policy goals and 
creating positive economic change in the long-term, it will likely result in failing to achieve all 
of one’s goals, and thus limiting that economic success to much lower standards than those 
presidents who performed the best. In particular, President Jimmy Carter’s failures in relying 
on Executive Orders that were mostly overturned by future presidents, and having a key 
veto overridden by Congress, show that a president’s hard powers are not the most effective 
means of creating policy that will be long-lasting, and therefore have a long-lasting impact. 
This is especially clear when it is shown that Carter’s legislative accomplishments using his 
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soft powers had an astronomical impact on both long-term policy and economic 
performance.  
Similarly, President George H.W. Bush’s failure to sustain his predecessor’s political 
coalition, and poor use of political rhetoric by going back on campaign promises, ended any 
chance for his administration to be reelected or have as large of an impact as he had hoped. 
Finally, the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies showcase the dangers of 
growing partisanship on both policymaking and economic well-being, as each of these 
presidents were unable to sustain early legislative victories. In the case of President Obama 
in particular, the lack of a political alliances led to not only a struggle in deploying soft-
powers, but even hybrid and hard powers. 
 What can these findings tell us about the actions of current and future presidents? 
Will rising political polarization continue to drive wedges between the Executive Branch and 
other parts of the federal government, eventually turning the long-term economic trends 
into a downward spiral that nobody can act on in order to prevent or change? Or will 
occupants of the Oval Office attempt to emulate the most successful of presidential 
administrations, and seek to take a multi-front approach to policymaking that balances hard, 
hybrid, and soft powers, focusing on building lasting coalitions that establish longevity for 
policies, their economic impacts, and the type of leader that is in control of the White 
House? This study helped find a possible path forward for future presidents, but it will take 
both further research to help make that path more clear, as well as presidents willing to 
follow it in order for presidential powers to be deployed in a manner that has the greatest 
long-term impact on the national economy. 
 
 




A Path Forward 
 
Drawing on Our New Knowledge to Understand Future 
Presidential Policy Decisions and Their Impacts 
 
 
“It’s amazing what you can accomplish if you do not care who gets the credit.” 
-Harry S. Truman, Thirty-Third President of the United States of America 
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The Problem 
 
This journey began with a single observation during the 2012 presidential election. A 
memorable moment during the second debate illustrated what seemed to be a change in how 
voters were holding presidents accountable for economic performance. In the past, academic 
research has devoted substantial resources to discover the links between people’s concerns 
about the state of the national economy and presidential election results, focusing on how a 
president’s impact on the economy during their time in office either determined their own 
reelection efforts or the outcomes of midterm elections and campaigns to succeed the 
current president. The research found significant correlations between people holding 
presidential candidates and their political parties accountable for economic conditions in 
times near national elections, with evidence pointing to presidents taking certain actions 
within their power to help positively influence the economy directly before an election in the 
hopes of such actions generating a positive result. 
The town hall debate in 2012, however, seemed to be changing this long-held view. 
During the debate, both candidates were asked to respond to the following question from an 
audience member: 
Governor Romney, I am an undecided voter, because I'm disappointed with 
the lack of progress I've seen in the last four years. However, I do attribute 
much of America's economic and international problems to the failings and 
missteps of the Bush administration. Since both you and President Bush are 
Republicans, I fear a return to the policies of those years should you win this 
election. What is the biggest difference between you and George W. Bush, 
and how do you differentiate yourself from George W. Bush?137 
 
The participant framed the question around their concern for the economy, aligning with 
previous research that stated economic issues are a driving force in voters’ decision-making 
 
137 Commission on Presidential Debates, “October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript.” October 16, 2012, Hofstra 
University, Hempstead, NY. http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-16-2012-the-second-obama-
romney-presidential-debate 
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process. However, the voter states that they attribute America’s economic problems to the 
Bush administration, even though in 2012, President George W. Bush had not been in office 
for four years. Why did the voter not attribute the slow growth following the 2008 financial 
collapse to the current Obama administration, as past political science and economic thought 
would lead us to believe? 
In regards to the 2012 election, the credit (or in this case, blame) for economic well-
being has taken on a more nuanced standard than previously observed by social scientists. 
As Gary C. Jacobson points out: 
The public’s view of the economy was overwhelmingly negative: at the start 
of the election year, 79 percent of Americans had rated the economy as 
“fairly bad” or “very bad,” and 68 percent continued to do so in October. 
And throughout the year, large majorities identified the weak economy as the 
most important national problem and election issue… 
The public also doubted the efficacy of Obama’s policies for dealing with 
economic challenges. His stimulus package (the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009) continued to get at best tepid reviews, although 
not as bad as in 2010; the results of an October 2012 Pew survey were 
typical: just 33 percent of respondents believed that it improved the 
economy, with 35 percent saying it made it worse and 27 percent saying it 
made no difference. On average, during 2012, only 43 percent of Americans 
approved of Obama’s economic management…  
Based on the historical record, economic conditions were clearly a major 
threat to Obama’s reelection. How was he able to survive the threat?...What 
protected Obama from the full force of economic discontent? In a word, 
partisanship…Obama won because, despite the weak economy, he received 
overwhelming approval and electoral support from ordinary Democrats… 
A good part of the reason is that Democrats could and did blame 
someone other than Obama for economic problems: George W. 
Bush…a majority of Americans continued to blame Bush more than Obama 
for economic conditions throughout Obama’s first term…[and] among 
Democrats, however, the margin did not diminish at all.138 
 
138 Jacobson, Gary C. 2013. “How the Economy and Partisanship Shaped the 2012 [US] Presidential and 
Congressional Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 128 (1): 1-38. 
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Not only were voters shifting their belief in which president was responsible for the 
economy at any given time, but according to Jacobson, President Obama and Democrats 
had successfully used the long-term evaluation to help win reelection by putting the blame 
on the slow recovery on the previous president. However, as Tim Kane notes, assigning 
credit or blame for economic conditions is not an easy feat, especially when one is looking 
through a long-term lens. He states that: 
At an April 21, 1961 news conference, President Kennedy famously 
remarked that, “victory has one hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” 
The same might be said of expansions and recessions. Who should get credit 
for the mid-1990s boom? Reagan laid the institutional foundation. Bush 
made the tough fiscal compromise. Clinton cut taxes and put NAFTA into 
effect. All deserve credit, it would seem. But who deserves blame for the 
double-digit inflation of the late 1970s? A case can be made to blame Carter, 
Ford, Nixon, and Johnson.139  
 
Therefore, if the public is shifting away from simply attributing national economic well-being 
to the current president, it is imperative to determine which presidents are truly responsible 
for the state of the economy at any given time over the long-term. In doing so, voters will be 
better equipped to make a decision on which president was truly successful at achieving their 
stated goals, which presidents had a negative or positive impact on the economy, and which 
candidates, parties, and policies should be supported with their vote in future elections. 
Additionally, future presidents can better understand the impact each of their predecessors 
truly had on the national economy, and adjust their strategy and behavior accordingly in 
order to ensure the country experiences an upward trend in economic performance across a 
number of various indicators. Finally, doing so effectively ensures that a president can build 
 
139 Kane, Timothy. 2017. “Presidents and the US Economy from 1949 to 2016.” Economics Working Papers 
17101, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
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the popularity, support, and coalition that allows for these successes to compound and 
multiply over each administration that comes into office, each trying to emulate the other in 
order to get credit for the economic success, rather than simply overriding all of the previous 
work of the presidents who came before and ensuring that no policy coming from the 
executive could last beyond the short-term. 
 
 
What Have We Learned? 
 
This study set out to find the answers to these questions and provide both the 
evidence necessary to chart a better path forward, as well as build a foundation for future 
research to better understand this change in voter perspective and its impact on national 
politics and economic conditions. It is this structure that makes up the Framework for Long-
term Economic Examination (FLEX), which can be used to broaden these inquiries even 
further. 
The first chapter examined whether or not presidents have the desire and incentive 
to influence the long-term national economy through the office’s policymaking powers, and 
determine what those goals were for each of the selected presidents. The analysis was 
contained only to a select group of modern presidential administrations in order to ensure 
political neutrality, to limit outliers and unique historical anomalies that may exist in pre-
modern and even more recent administrations, and to ensure accurate data on the long-term 
impact of policies could be gathered and analyzed. It should be noted that while these 
limitations allow for a clearer focus on this thesis’s questions, further research should be 
undertaken to go beyond these restrictions. 
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Presidential addresses and interviews with top-level economic advisors indicate that 
every modern president has sought to influence the long-term national economy by using 
their presidential powers to enact policies that would have major economic consequences for 
the entire country. Each speech, address, and report by the selected presidents contained 
language (highlighted in bold above) that indicated a long-term view of their individual 
actions. While national addresses were often more high-level, big-picture focused, and meant 
to establish a comprehensive vision of the president’s entire agenda, the Economic Reports 
of the President and interviews with various economic advisors throughout the past decades 
helped to identify specific economic policy goals for each administration, as well as 
confirmed that these policies were proposed with a long-term existence in mind. These long-
term economic policy goals raise various new questions and identify that some goals are 
consistent across all administrations, while others are seemingly determined by the 
president’s party or era. Answers to these questions come from understanding that 
presidents, both as candidates for the office as well as incumbents seeking to cement a 
positive legacy, are incentivized to create policies that the public views as having a positive 
economic impact on the nation. Therefore, presidents are oftentimes attempting to establish 
the long-term policies necessary to address consistent economic concerns for the nation, 
whether or not past presidents have attempted to the do the same, and will also take on new 
issues that arise in the public’s concern. 
The second chapter provides data to answer the question of whether or not 
presidents can influence the long-term national economy through the office’s policymaking 
powers. The chapter also determined which presidents and powers are most effective at 
enacting such policies. Analysis showed both successes and failures within each 
administration, and identified how each president used different types of available power.  
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The analysis further found that presidents that utilized both the hard and soft powers of 
coalition and party building, particularly when working with the Senate to ratify trade and 
investment treaties, more successfully enacted far-reaching and long-lasting economic 
policies, though these powers were not consistent in creating successes among every 
presidency. 
This evidence appears to contradict Schlesinger’s and Neustadt’s traditional 
presidential power theories, because success rates were not continually increasing over time 
as more and more power became concentrated in an imperial office of the president, and 
persuasive presidents such as Clinton were less successful at enacting certain policies than 
less talented users of rhetoric and public opinion, such as W. Bush. Indeed, the evidence of 
presidential success actually indicates that long-term economic powers of the president fall in 
line with Skowronek’s theory of presidents being subjects to what he calls “political time,” 
stating: 
 
It takes more than a new coalition and a new constitutional vision, more than a new 
program bursting with material services and supports with which to develop the 
nation’s economy, more than political sensitivity to public opinion and skill 
manipulating it, but it also takes the correct political time and conditions to act.140 
 
Skowronek’s theory, attests that political time is actually cyclical, and that the most successful 
presidents come into power during similar circumstances, as do those that are the least 
successful, and all follow identical tracks on how their presidencies develop. Those that are 
the most successful administrations are those that enter office during times of revolutionary 
political regime change, usually from one party to another, and often seek to establish new 
 
140 Skowronek, Stephen. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, Revised 
Edition. Belknap Press. 119. 
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orders in opposition of those that seemingly failed in the previous administration, all of 
which could describe the presidencies of Reagan and Clinton. Their direct successors, such 
as H.W. Bush, can only try to sustain this revolution, but often come up shorter than the 
revolutionaries, as the ability to hold together such power and influence often wanes over 
time (Light’s Paradox applied to the long-term). Eventually, the regime will fall apart and 
those trying to hold power during this time will often face the task of trying to bridge the 
fallen regime with the impeding revolution, but most fail to reach the levels of support 
needed to achieve full revolutionary change due to the persistence of old guards in place. 
Finally, a new revolutionary will return and usher in the most drastic change seen in the 
presidency in years, and thus use all of the powers of the office to their greatest potentials in 
enacting desired policies. 
This theory is the best at describing which presidents were successful in enacting 
long-term economic changes. The theory and the evidence provided from this study does 
provide a future framework to determine which presidents have had and will have in 
influencing the long-term national economy during their presidencies.  Revolutionaries like 
Reagan and Clinton not only had the greatest amount of success in using coalition building 
to enact long-term economic policies, but they also benefited from the unique circumstances 
of opportunities of the political lifecycle that those less successful presidents did not 
experience. Carter could not end inflation, H.W. Bush was unable to continue Reagan’s 
legacy, and W. Bush could not pass Social Security reform all because they were trying to 
make these things happen before the country was ready for the changes to take place. 
Instead, their efforts provided the basic framework for their successors’ achievements, 
allowing them to draw on both the insight and failings of previous attempts and combine 
them with their own political resources to take advantage of a later political time and pass 
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sweeping, revolutionary policies that would have an impact on the long-term national 
economy. 
By taking into account the long-term impact of presidential policies on multiple 
economic measures of well-being, it is clear that presidents do indeed have an impact on the 
national economy for years beyond their own time in office. Yet, the overall effectiveness of 
each administration over the long-term is almost identical to their overall performance in the 
short-term, with only marginal changes in the rankings of each president within the various 
categories of economic change. This should not be too surprising, however, because looking 
at the aggregate performance of the U.S. economy across multiple decades and various 
presidential administrations, there are general positive trends in various categories that 
suggest a president only has a minimal level of influencing these economic indicators in 
either the short- or long-term.  
 This thesis did find a consistent pattern for why certain administrations successfully 
have a positive, and potentially large, impact on the national economy. For example, both 
President Reagan and President Clinton were more successful at implementing long-term 
economic reform than President Carter, President Obama, or either President Bush. Upon 
further analysis, evidence appears to suggest that success comes from presidential efforts to 
push policies through a variety of means. Presidents were not only able to create necessary 
coalitions to support their policies, but they were also able to sustain these coalitions for a 
majority of their term. In cases where coalitions began to breakdown, there is also evidence 
that Presidents were able to build new collaborations by deploying various powers. For 
example, President Reagan was able to break the air traffic controller strike and President 
Clinton veto of the 1995-1996 budget and handling of the subsequent governmental 
shutdown. In these cases, presidents appear to have left office more popular than during the 
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middle of their term. President Reagan also benefited from the fact that this coalition and 
popularity building resulted in the election of his own vice president as his successor, 
effectively cementing many of his top policy achievements into the long-term fabric of U.S. 
policy, and thus, economic impact.  
 Yet the failures of certain administrations in meeting their economic goals can still be 
useful guidance for future administrations seeking positive economic change. For example, 
President Jimmy Carter’s failures in relying on Executive Orders that were mostly 
overturned by future presidents, and having a key veto overridden by Congress, show that a 
president’s hard powers are not the most effective means of creating policy that will be long-
lasting, and therefore have a long-lasting impact. This is especially clear when it is shown that 
Carter’s legislative accomplishments using his soft powers had an astronomical impact on 
both long-term policy and economic performance. Similarly, President George H.W. Bush’s 
failure to sustain his predecessor’s political coalition, and poor use of political rhetoric by 
going back on campaign promises, ended any chance for his administration to be reelected 
or have as large of an impact as he had hoped. Finally, the George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama presidencies showcase the dangers of growing partisanship on both policymaking 
and economic well-being, as each of these presidents were unable to sustain early legislative 
victories. In the case of President Obama in particular, the lack of a political alliances led to 
not only a struggle in deploying soft-powers, but even hybrid and hard powers with less 
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What Is the Significance? 
 
What can these findings tell us about the actions of current and future presidents? 
Will rising political polarization continue to drive wedges between the Executive Branch and 
other parts of the federal government, eventually turning the long-term economic trends 
into a downward spiral that nobody can act on in order to prevent or change? Or will 
occupants of the Oval Office attempt to emulate the most successful of presidential 
administrations, and seek to take a multi-front approach to policymaking that balances hard, 
hybrid, and soft powers, focusing on building lasting coalitions that establish longevity for 
policies, their economic impacts, and the type of leader that is in control of the White 
House? This study helped find a possible path forward for future presidents to ensure they 
affect long-term economic policy. Further research, however, is required to suggest a 
template for the deployment of presidential powers to achieve the administration’s goals. 
The American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara has already begun tracking 
the actions of current President Joe Biden. The Project describes how the Biden campaign, 
like the previous administrations looked at in this study, identified a set of “Day One” 
priorities.  These especially featured: Climate change (including reentering the Paris 
Agreement); diversity of political appointees; immigration and asylum; COVID-19 (and the 
related economic crisis); racial injustice; creating a path to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants. By February 4th, each of these has been addressed in at least one ordering 
document, and all of them were addressed in orders on “day one.”141 Among those actions, 
Biden had promised to submit legislation for Immigration Reform--which the White House 
announced on 1/20. The bill was introduced in the House on 2/18/21; Senate introduction 
 
141 Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley. April 30, 2021. “Biden in Action: the First 100 Days.” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/analyses/biden-action-the-first-100-days 
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was in the week of 2/22/21.  However, in the past weeks, controversy has already arisen 
about whether Biden is reneging on his promise to restore refugee admissions in line with 
historic practices.142 
From the Project’s table below, President Biden has followed in the footsteps of the 
Reagan and Clinton administrations, seemingly on track to produce high volumes of policies 
that can result in longer lasting, positive economic change in the long-run. As Table 18 
shows, EO usage continues to grow with each administration, as does the number of prior 
EOs revoked by successive administrations. President Biden has outpaced all of his 
 immediate successors by an enormous amount in both the total number of EOs issued. Yet, 
as his astronomically high number of prior EOs revoked should show him, the current 
president must realize that EOs are easily overturned if coalitions are not built and put in 
place to ensure not just the longevity of the orders, but also of the broader policies the 




142 Beitsch, Rebecca, and Rafael Bernal. May 5, 2021. “Biden Immigration Moves Under Scrutiny from Left and 
Right.” https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/551256-biden-immigration-moves-under-scrutiny-
from-left-and-right 
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Table 18: EOs by President in First 100 Days143 
 
  
Though it is still early in his term, the president has already signed groundbreaking 
legislation, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA). While the President currently 
enjoys Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, the unified ability of Democrats 
to work together is showing some signs of division, as some Democratic Senators have 
publicly opposed immigration reform and a federal minimum wage hike.144 If President 
Biden would like to avoid repeating President Obama’s path, he might examine President 
Clinton’s actions. President Clinton suffered a historic defeat on healthcare reform, but 
ultimately managed to have a large and positive impact on the long-term national economy.  
 
143 Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley. April 30, 2021. “Biden in Action: the First 100 Days.” The American 
Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/analyses/biden-action-the-first-100-days 
144 Everett, Burgess. March 5, 2021. “8 Democrats Defect on $15 Minimum Wage Hike.” Politico. 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/05/democrats-15-minimum-wage-hike-473875 
President  Start Date End Date 
Count 













Joe Biden 1/20/2021 4/16/2021 40 19 62 
      
Donald 
Trump 
1/20/2017 4/16/2017 23 7 12 
      
Barack 
Obama 
1/20/2009 4/16/2009 19 7 9 
      
George W. 
Bush 
1/20/2001 4/16/2001 11 5 5 
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Evidence from this study suggests that despite growing political polarization, Biden 
should be well-equipped to maintain good relationships with Congress and strong coalitions 
to help him pass his desired policies, given his long career as a Senator and Vice-President, 
which make him the penultimate Washington-insider. This gives him a clear advantage over 
Clinton. Yet President George W. Bush had similar resources and suffered, like Obama, in 
maintaining the momentum from the beginning of his term to accomplish all of his policy 
goals. Thus, Biden will need to follow the path set out by this work’s findings if he wishes to 
have a long-lasting and positive impact on the national economy: 
• Balance use of all powers available to the presidency, not just relying solely 
on issuing EOs (which are easily overturned), nor wasting all energy and 
political capital on sweeping legislation (which could still fail, and thus, 
damage future legislative attempts) 
• Balance keeping campaign promises without overloading controversial 
policies into the work at the start of the presidential term, as too much 
partisan policies will likely result in a referendum from the opposing party in 
the midterms, or even the next presidential election, jeopardizing any future 
policies being passed or upheld 
• Take advantage of the work by previous presidents in order to build on their 
success. In President Biden’s case, look to capitalize on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, which has the potential to create massive 
economic change for the country, similar to how President Clinton leveraged 
NAFTA to his advantage 
• Counter growing partisanship with unique deployments of presidential power 
that don’t just avoid confronting the opposition, but rather strengthen the 
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position of the president in the public’s mind (similar to how President 
Clinton utilized the veto and government shutdown to his advantage over 
Republicans in Congress who tried to gut his budget proposal) 
• Continue to build new coalitions in addition to trying to maintain the old, as 
it is more important to the longevity of policies if the administration is seen 
as more favorable by the public at the end of the term, rather than the 
beginning 
 
What More Can Be Done? 
 In addition to these best practices, additional work can be done to provide an even 
more clear path forward for President Biden, and future occupants of the White House. As 
mentioned throughout this work, this study merely serves as a starting point to investigate 
the long-term impact of presidential policies on the national economy. To better understand 
this impact, and be able to prescribe the presidential powers and actions necessary to create 
positive economic change in the long-term will require much more nuanced and detailed 
study moving forward. A few key areas of focus include: 
• More detailed analysis of direct correlations and causations between specific 
presidential policies and their impact on the national economy. 
o This study provided a list of various policies identified by the presidents 
themselves in their various speeches, addresses and economic reports.  
 However, these lists are not comprehensive of either all of the polices 
a president pursues, nor all the ones they successfully pass into law.  
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 A more detailed list of presidential policies for each president is thus 
needed to provide the full picture of what actions presidents take 
while in office that may impact the long-term economic conditions. 
o More detailed documenting of each of these policies is required to 
understand whether or not they had any impact in the long-run.  
 This study provided a high-level count of certain presidential policies, 
and whether or not they were initially passed, and whether or not 
they survived into the long-term time period past the president’s own 
time in office. However, as more details on the full policy actions 
come into focus (see point above), it becomes more critical to 
document the short- and long-term status of each of these policies. 
o Direct empirical analysis connecting each policy to their likely economic 
impact in the long-term.  
 While this study examined the broad economic trends over the long-
term time period for each president, and discussed how each 
identified policy (or failed policy) impacted these and other economic 
factors, more work can, and should be, done in order to be able to 
draw direct lines between specific actions and specific outcomes. 
• Additional analysis of presidents outside of the sample in this study. 
o While the presidents in this study were chosen for specific reasons of 
controls and available data, efforts should be made to perform long-term 
economic evaluations on all of the past presidents in order to better identify 
patterns over time.  
• Consideration of additional presidential powers and economic measures of success. 
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o While this study tried to be more comprehensive than past works in regards 
to measurements used both for presidential actions and economic measures 
of success, it is still not complete.  
 Though seemingly unlikely to have a great amount of impact on the 
national economy, presidential powers such as pardons need to also 
be analyzed for potential impact.  
 Likewise, additional economic measures, such as trade deficits, 
national savings rates, etc. should be added to any analysis in order to 
provide a full picture of all of the different ways a president can 
impact the economy, and how these policies impact real people.  
 
Work in each of these areas, and several others, would better equip academics, 
government officials, and potential presidents to understand how each of the White House’s 
actions and inactions will impact the national economy, thus allowing them to focus only on 
those that would have a positive outcome in the long-term. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 Presidents often face insurmountable challenges when trying to pass any type of 
policy. This is even more true with polices that are overtly complicated, multi-faceted, and 
wide-reaching, such as those with the potential to impact the national economy in the long-
term. This essay by no means satisfies the criteria of serving as a guide to any Commander-
in-Chief seeking answers to all of their policymaking questions. However, it does serve as a 
starting point on the path to better understand. The study makes clear that the long-term 
consequences of a president’s actions are important, not just to president’s themselves 
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seeking to shape their own legacy, but also the voting public. Concentrating on creating 
positive economic change in the long-run benefits not only the country at large, but also the 
chances of a president receiving the support they need to accomplish their various goals, for 
themselves, their party, and their country. As President Lyndon Johnson said, “It's not doing 
what is right that's hard for a President. It's knowing what is right.” This and future studies 










 The following interviews were conducted in late 2013. Each questionnaire contains 
the same five questions seeking insight into the respondent’s expertise and experiences as a 
chief economic advisor to one of the six U.S. Presidents studied in this essay. Respondents 
were initially contacted through email requests asking to respond to the survey. Of the ten 
current and form Directors of the National Economic Council, eight requests were 
successfully sent and two participated in the survey (25% success rate), while three of the 
fifteen Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers completed the survey (20% success 
rate). Of the five completed responses, four were filled out electronically and sent back at 
the respondent’s own leisure, with follow-up questions and clarification done by email, while 
one survey was conducted by phone interview, interspersing the same five key questions 
with additional relevant dialogue. The following pages contain the original forms of 
questions and answers from the respondents, all of whom declined to have their answers 
published anonymously and which were used throughout this study as a key original resource 
material. 
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Interview of: Dr. Austan Goolsbee  
Email: goolsbee@chicagobooth.edu 
Interview Date: November 13, 2013 
 
My name is Michael Lyons and I am currently working toward both a Master of Arts 
in Government and a Master of Science in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins 
University. This interview will be used toward my master’s thesis, which seeks to determine 
which presidential executive powers have the greatest impact on implementing long-term 
economic policies. I hope to continue this research as I pursue my doctorate, as well. Thank 
you for your time – I appreciate any and all knowledge you’re willing to bestow on me, not 
only from your position as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to President 




1. Were there any long-term economic policies, or policies that would have large long-
term impacts on the national economy, that the Obama Administration sought to 
accomplish? If so, what were these policies? If not, why weren’t there? 
 
Let's think about this in the context of the ARRA. There was a disagreement 
among advisors over the nature of the recession and whether it would be a sharp 
V shaped recession/recovery or a long, extended slow recovery. For the V shape 
advocates, the stimulus should be as quick as possible because long-run things 
would only get spent after the recovery had already begun, making them 
inflationary and not addressing the pressing issues. For the group saying 
extended and slow, the situation called for long-term investment in economic 
infrastructure, clean energy technology and the like. Unable to decide, mostly it 
ended up being a collection of some of a lot of things, some short and some long.  
 
 
2. How did the Obama Administration plan on achieving these long-term goals? What 
were the main tools and/or presidential powers intended to be used to accomplish 
this? 
 
Mainly these were policy and legislative decisions. 
 
 
3. What institutional roadblocks and pushback did the administration face from other 
policy makers and political groups while trying to implement these policies? How 
were these challenges overcome? If they were not, why? 
 
Main roadblocks were two: 1) internally, economists often had disagreements 
over the nature and progress of the economy—like in 2010 trying to decide if the 
economy was sufficiently recovered that it made sense to start cutting the deficit 
in the short-run or not or whether to save the auto industry with a bailout in 2009, 
2) externally, the rise of republican opposition in congress seemingly intent on 
1 Requests Anonymity: _____ Yes        _____ No 
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opposing anything the president supported. It's pretty hard to do policy and 
legislative policy or even nominate people for jobs in that environment. 
 
4. Were the originally intended tools and powers of the president enough to overcome 
all opposition or were new methods utilized to reach the end goal? If so, what were 
they and why were they not in the original plans? 
 
Don't know about that one. 
 
 
5. Finally, were the Obama Administration’s goals reached and was President Obama 
and his staff satisfied with the end result? If not, why? How have any 
accomplishments continued to impact the national economy today? 
 
Many goals were reached and the most important—that we not have another 
great depression—will be remembered by historians forever as a very substantial 
accomplishment. The financial and economic hit to the economy was larger than 
the one in 1929 so it could easily have been just as bad or worse as the experience 
of the 1930s had the financial system collapsed. 
 
But it's clear that the recovery has been slow and extended and the job market 
remains deeply scarred with a long way to go before it could be considered a 
complete success. 
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Interview of: Dr. Harvey S. Rosen  
Email: hsr@princeton.edu 
Interview Date: November 13, 2013 
 
My name is Michael Lyons and I am currently working toward both a Master of Arts 
in Government and a Master of Science in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins 
University. This interview will be used toward my master’s thesis, which seeks to determine 
which presidential executive powers have the greatest impact on implementing long-term 
economic policies. I hope to continue this research as I pursue my doctorate, as well. Thank 
you for your time – I appreciate any and all knowledge you’re willing to bestow on me, not 
only from your position as the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to President 




1. Were there any long-term economic policies, or policies that would have large long-
term impacts on the national economy, that the Bush Administration sought to 
accomplish? If so, what were these policies? If not, why weren’t there? 
 
During my tenure on the CEA, the policy that would have had the greatest long-
term impact on the national economy was the reform of the Social Security 
system.  Social Security is actuarially unsound, and the purpose of the proposal 
was to put it on a firm long-term financial basis. 
 
2. How did the Bush Administration plan on achieving these long-term goals? What 
were the main tools and/or presidential powers intended to be used to accomplish 
this? 
 
The president made several speeches, as did several senior members of his 
administration.  As well, members of the president’s staff lobbied members of 
congress as well as many of the important stakeholders (e.g., AARP). 
 
3. What institutional roadblocks and pushback did the administration face from other 
policy makers and political groups while trying to implement these policies? How 
were these challenges overcome? If they were not, why? 
 
One challenge was that several of the stakeholders believed that any change to 
the existing law would lead to others, and the entire government safety net would 
unravel.  Another challenge was that during the Bush administration, like now, 
the political atmosphere in Washington was poisonous, and Democrats, as well 
as their political allies, were not willing to do anything that would give the 
president a victory.  Finally, it proved impossible to convince the stakeholders 
that there was a sense of urgency, i.e., that the program was not on a viable long-
term financial path. In particular, Members of Congress are not inclined to make 
any difficult political decisions unless they are confronted with an immediate 
crisis. 
 
2 Requests Anonymity: _____ Yes        _____ No 
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4. Were the originally intended tools and powers of the president enough to overcome 
all opposition or were new methods utilized to reach the end goal? If so, what were 
they and why were they not in the original plans? 
 
Unfortunately, they were not.  My own view is that there would have been a 
higher probability of success if the president had been explicit during the 2004 
campaign that if he were elected, he would pursue Social Security reform.  
Hence, even though he was elected, he really didn’t have a mandate. 
 
5. Finally, were the Bush Administration’s goals reached and was President Bush and 
his staff satisfied with the end result? If not, why? How have any accomplishments 
continued to impact the national economy today? 
 
Everyone was bitterly disappointed that we made no progress on this effort. 
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Interview of: Mr. Allan Hubbard  
Email: ahubbard@ea-companies.com 
Interview Date:  
  
My name is Michael Lyons and I am currently working toward both a Master of Arts 
in Government and a Master of Science in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins 
University. This interview will be used toward my master’s thesis, which seeks to determine 
which presidential executive powers have the greatest impact on implementing long-term 
economic policies. I hope to continue this research as I pursue my doctorate, as well. Thank 
you for your time – I appreciate any and all knowledge you’re willing to bestow on me, not 
only from your position as the Director of the National Economic Council to President 




1. Were there any long-term economic policies, or policies that would have large long-
term impacts on the national economy, that the Bush Administration sought to 
accomplish? If so, what were these policies? If not, why weren’t there? 
 
The tax cuts of 2001 & 2003, Medicare D, several trade acts, and energy policies, 
all of which we were successful in enacting. We also attempted social security 
reform, immigration reform, and healthcare reform, all of which were not. 
 
2. How did the Bush Administration plan on achieving these long-term goals? What 
were the main tools and/or presidential powers intended to be used to accomplish 
this? 
 
Legislative lobbying mostly. Medicare was very successful using this method to 
pass and then implement, while HHS Secretary Levitz helped by doing an 
education campaign on the road to gain public support for it as well. 
 
3. What institutional roadblocks and pushback did the administration face from other 
policy makers and political groups while trying to implement these policies? How 
were these challenges overcome? If they were not, why? 
 
Challenges from 2005 to 2006 often resulted from Democratically controlled 
Congress who blocked privatizing Social Security. Ironically, it was Republicans 
who blocked immigration reform, and both parties were reluctant to tackle 
healthcare reform, leaving no traction for the administration who had only a few 
supporters in the Senate (Republicans were not ready for such a political issue 
and Democrats were not helpful). 
 
 
4. Were the originally intended tools and powers of the president enough to overcome 
all opposition or were new methods utilized to reach the end goal? If so, what were 
they and why were they not in the original plans? 
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Immigration began without enough security for some, and because initial efforts 
did not emphasize it enough, the entire messaging had to be retooled. Medicare 
reform originally provided D and voucher, but had to drop the voucher system 
due to opposition. Legislation is always a back and forth. 
 
5. Finally, were the Bush Administration’s goals reached and was President Bush and 
his staff satisfied with the end result? If not, why? How have any accomplishments 
continued to impact the national economy today? 
 
President Bush got a lot done, but everyone was frustrated over what wasn’t 
done. 
Were able to establish lower tax rates that allowed for more money in the private 
sector and President Obama could not undo it, trade deals increased free trade, 
and Medicare Part D gave seniors better access to needed drugs and proved that 
a free market system works with 30% less than projected costs for the changes. 
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Interview of: Mr. Keith Hennessey 
Email: keith@keithhennessey.com 
Interview Date: November 14, 2013 
  
My name is Michael Lyons and I am currently working toward both a Master of Arts 
in Government and a Master of Science in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins 
University. This interview will be used toward my master’s thesis, which seeks to determine 
which presidential executive powers have the greatest impact on implementing long-term 
economic policies. I hope to continue this research as I pursue my doctorate, as well. Thank 
you for your time – I appreciate any and all knowledge you’re willing to bestow on me, not 
only from your position as the Director of the National Economic Council to President 




1. Were there any long-term economic policies, or policies that would have large long-
term impacts on the national economy, that the Bush Administration sought to 
accomplish? If so, what were these policies? If not, why weren’t there? 
 
Absolutely. In 2002 and early 2003 we had a short-term focus, as well as in the 
second half of 2008. During he rest of the Bush Administration our principal 
economic focus was on policies to maximize long-term economic growth.  The 
income tax rate cuts, dividend tax rate cuts, Social Security reforms, and energy 
policies are all notable examples of a long-term policy focus. 
 
2. How did the Bush Administration plan on achieving these long-term goals? What 
were the main tools and/or presidential powers intended to be used to accomplish 
this? 
 
In almost all cases we needed to persuade Congress to act.  Economic policy is 
made principally by the legislative branch of government, so we were using the 
President's and Administration's powers of persuasion to get them to act.  In 
some cases we were successful, in others less so. 
 
3. What institutional roadblocks and pushback did the administration face from other 
policy makers and political groups while trying to implement these policies? How 
were these challenges overcome? If they were not, why? 
 
This is too broad of a question for me to answer.  But our primary non-policy 
constraint was legislative rather than political.  In the Bush White House we 
focused on good policy that implemented the President's values and 
choices.  Interest group and political pressure was relevant principally to the 
extent that it constrained our ability to get the votes we needed in Congress. 
 
4. Were the originally intended tools and powers of the president enough to overcome 
all opposition or were new methods utilized to reach the end goal? If so, what were 
they and why were they not in the original plans? 
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Our methods were fairly straightforward:  design a good policy, propose it, work 
with Congress to enact it.  We rarely used "other tools." 
 
5. Finally, were the Bush Administration’s goals reached and was President Bush and 
his staff satisfied with the end result? If not, why? How have any accomplishments 
continued to impact the national economy today? 
 
Again, this is too broad of a question for a good answer.  Some of our goals were 
enacted into law and will likely remain in place for a long time.  Others were 
successful at the time but have been modified or repealed since President Bush 
left office.  Still others, like Social Security reform, were not enacted or even 
considered legislatively when they were proposed by President Bush, but that 
doesn't mean they were unsuccessful.  I am confident they will serve as models 
for future legislation, so we were laying the groundwork for a future debate. 
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Interview of: Dr. Murray Weidenbaum 
Email: moseley@wustl.edu 
Interview Date: November 14, 2013 
  
My name is Michael Lyons and I am currently working toward both a Master of Arts 
in Government and a Master of Science in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins 
University. This interview will be used toward my master’s thesis, which seeks to determine 
which presidential executive powers have the greatest impact on implementing long-term 
economic policies. I hope to continue this research as I pursue my doctorate, as well. Thank 
you for your time – I appreciate any and all knowledge you’re willing to bestow on me, not 
only from your position Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to President 




1. Were there any long-term economic policies, or policies that would have large long-
term impacts on the national economy, that the Reagan Administration sought to 
accomplish? If so, what were these policies? If not, why weren’t there? 
 
Basically to strengthen the private sector by reducing the role of government, in 
all its dimensions. 
 
 
2. How did the Reagan Administration plan on achieving these long-term goals? What 
were the main tools and/or presidential powers intended to be used to accomplish 
this? 
 
We issued in February 1981 a detailed plan of action (Reaganomics).  The main 
tools were tax cuts, spending cuts, and regulatory reform.  Aside from regulatory 
reform, most of the plan required congressional approval. 
The major “tools” were presidential speechmaking and working with Congress. 
 
 
3. What institutional roadblocks and pushback did the administration face from other 
policy makers and political groups while trying to implement these policies? How 
were these challenges overcome? If they were not, why? 
 
Every change was objected to by one interest group or another.  Key 
administration officials testified before congressional committees and worked 
with members and their staffs. 
 
 
4. Were the originally intended tools and powers of the president enough to overcome 
all opposition or were new methods utilized to reach the end goal? If so, what were 
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5. Finally, were the Reagan Administration’s goals reached and was President Reagan 
and his staff satisfied with the end result? If not, why? How have any 
accomplishments continued to impact the national economy today? 
 
On balance, there was a general belief that President Reagan had made a big and 
lasting difference.  Inflation was the public’s #1 concern when he took office.  It 
has not been a serious problem since.  His successful effort at across-the-board 
tax cuts has been followed since.  The budget deficits were not planned, but they 
have been greatly exceeded since. 
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